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Summary: This paper aims to explore the constituent grammars of 
the margin of appreciation as a concept, and the way it is used by 
world trade judges, as well as the reasons for, and the immediate 
and potential outcomes directly and indirectly arising from, the plea 
to the concept when deciding WTO disputes relating to domestic so-
cietal regulation. In doing so, it is particularly important to demon-
strate, through a detailed analysis of GATT and WTO jurisprudence, 
that GATT/WTO judges have applied the necessity test in order to fol-
low different political agendas at different times – and also using the 
necessity narrative in various ways, including the hypothetical aim to 
‘discipline’ members to regulate in the least trade-restrictive way pos-
sible. Until the US-COOL Article 21.5 decision, under the TBT, world 
trade adjudicators, and especially the Appellate Body, added nuanc-
es to the necessity test with considerations related to the right of WTO 
members to regulate in order to set their own level of protection. The 
latest relevant interpretative development in US-COOL Article 21.5, 
namely the WTO Appellate Body’s plea for the margin of appreciation 
concept, may have interesting implications for future WTO jurispru-
dence. At least two scenarios are possible. Either the Appellate Body 
has tacitly suggested in this ruling that members have certain discre-
tion in considering what could constitute a legitimate objective of a 
particular regulation. Or the Appellate Body’s interpretation implies 
that the permissible degree of regulatory discretion of members actu-
ally rather depends on the importance of the objective to a member, 
and not – or to a lesser extent – on its legitimacy, so the latter should 
not be placed under strict scrutiny. 
1 Introduction
The rationale for WTO legal disciplines applying to risk-related is-
sues is to deliver a legal framework for state regulations promoting the 
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protection of human and plant life and health, the prevention of deceptive 
practices, the protection of the environment, etc, that can potentially af-
fect transboundary trade. It is argued that gradually traders have to face 
barriers resulting from such domestic regulations, particularly because 
different societies are not evenly risk averse.1 On the other hand, such so-
cietal matters as public health and the environment are areas where the 
regulatory process goes hand in hand with technical innovation. That is, 
regulation at the domestic level is increasingly affected by efficiency con-
cerns, such as necessity, scientific justification, procedural legitimacy, 
and consistency, resulting from a wide range of influences, ranging from 
the pressure of internal lobbies to coordination at the international level 
through the creation of international standards.2
The fact that some WTO disciplines are designed to strike a delicate 
balance between free trade and domestic regulatory autonomy pushed 
the WTO to the first row of key players in the global debate about risks. 
These disciplines are the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements. The SPS covers 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health from 
risks related to food and agricultural products. The TBT applies to the 
protection of the following: human safety or health; the prevention of de-
ceptive practices; the protection of plant life or health; and the protection 
of the environment.3 Other objectives may include quality (eg requiring 
that vegetables and fruits reach a certain size to be marketable), techni-
cal harmonisation (eg harmonising certain sectors, such as telecommu-
nications), or trade facilitation (eg harmonising customs equipment).4
One of the central tools of SPS/TBT regimes is the assessment of 
the creation and design of regulations related to risks. While the SPS has 
been tested in practice by WTO judges since the 1990s, the TBT was, 
until very recently, a rather ‘dormant’ WTO agreement, and was inter-
preted only once – in 2002. Since 2012, however, a few disputes have 
reached the stage of appeal and have been settled by WTO adjudicators. 
Therefore, as the SPS case law has been discussed at length since the late 
1990s, in this article I will focus on the TBT regime and case law. While I 
will sketch all the cases decided under the TBT, I will pay very particular 
attention to the rulings of WTO tribunals in the most recent case, US-
1 In this sense, see eg P Mavroidis, G Bermann, and M Wu, The Law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO): Documents, Cases and Analysis (West Law School 2010) 262-263.
2 BM Hoekman and MM Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The 
WTO and Beyond (OUP 1999) 462-465; A Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (CUP 
2011) 159; Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 1) 263. 
3 WTO, ‘Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade’   <http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm> accessed 11 October 2015; A Guzman and J Pau-
welyn, International Trade Law (Aspen Publishers 2009) 523.
4 ibid.
163CYELP 11 [2015] 161-213
COOL Article 21.5. Namely, in this case, world trade judges, especially the 
Appellate Body, when assessing the conflicting regulation, possibly tried 
to lean towards a strict proportionality test instead of the more traditional 
GATT/WTO necessity analysis. The latter implies ranking in favour of 
values of free trade and market competition while still recognising the 
states’ right to regulate. 
In this reasoning, WTO judges in particular raised, among other 
things, the concept of margin of appreciation – an approach known in do-
mestic administrative law along with proportionality stricto sensu, used 
and developed at the international level by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR, the Court). At the level of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the margin of appreciation refers to some 
‘latitude of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to 
national legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies’.5
The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: the Con-
vention) provides for a collective remedy that allows individuals to file an 
administrative appeal before the Court in Strasbourg in cases of a viola-
tion of the Convention and/or its additional protocols by a member state 
of the Convention.6 By ratifying the Convention, a state undertakes the 
obligation under its Article 1 ‘to secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion’ a set of rights and freedoms enshrined in the subsequent 18 articles 
(Section I) plus those other rights and freedoms contained in Protocols 1, 
4, 6 and 7, as amended by Protocol 11, should it decide to ratify them as 
well.7 The decisions of the ECtHR are binding on the contracting parties 
of the Convention.8 More recently, the margin of appreciation has been 
re-affirmed in the text of the Convention’s Preamble as follows: 
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsi-
bility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Con-
vention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they 
enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights estab-
lished by this Convention.9
5 HC Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff  1996). See also European Court of Human Rights, 
‘Application No 176/56 (Greece v United Kingdom, or the “Cyprus” case)’ (1958-1959) 2 
Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 174, 176.
6 Council of  Europe, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights’ <http://www.coe.
int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005 >; European Court of Human 
Rights, ‘The Court: General Presentation: How the Court Works’ <http://www.echr.coe.int/
Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitworks&c=#newComponent_1346158325959_pointer> 
accessed 29 May 2015.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 Protocol 15 to the Convention, adopted on 24 June 2013.
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In this article, I argue that there are embedded knowledge struc-
tures of specific WTO reasoning applying to societal regulation disputes 
that influence judicial decision-making in a very interesting way. In par-
ticular, until May 2015 when the WTO Appellate Body issued its ruling 
on US-COOL Article 21.5, world trade judges had never applied a strict 
proportionality test that the concept of margin of appreciation maps on, 
as the ECtHR would do that. Namely, the latter unambiguously balances 
the state measures in question against the objective pursued.
Before May 2015, the concept of margin of appreciation had not even 
once been explicitly applied or referred to within GATT/WTO litigation.10 
Oftentimes under the GATT,11 and under the TBT,12 while between two 
sets of values, trade values were ranked higher, the respect of other – 
non-trade – values of a defendant was deemed violating WTO law, but 
often necessary – especially in recent TBT jurisprudence. This does not 
correspond to a strict proportionality analysis. While proportionality stric-
to sensu relates to the proportionality of the means related to the ends, 
and the balancing between two values of equal footing, the necessity test 
means that the footing is a priori fixed in favour of one value. The concept 
of margin of appreciation, however, requires the strict proportionality 
test and a proper balancing exercise. The WTO adjudicators usually do 
not expressly acknowledge or state that they balance a national measure 
deemed trade-restrictive against the objective pursued by that measure.
In the first part of the article, I will track the main highlights of the 
ECHR regime, which are the most relevant for the margin of appreciation 
conceptualisation and interpretation. In the second part, I will briefly 
introduce the GATT/WTO relevant legislative and jurisprudential devel-
opments. In the third part, I will primarily sketch the fundamentals and 
relevant developments of the TBT framework. In the fourth part, I discuss 
the decisions in cases that have fully involved the TBT. I will address one, 
some or all of them (together with previous relevant disputes where need-
ed) for each special issue that I consider important for the overall analy-
10 The concept was never applied, but just mentioned in the following rulings: US-Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services: Arbitration Report (21 
December 2007) DS285, paras 4.16-18; EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas III: Arbitration Report (24 March 2000) DS27, para 52; US-Tax Treatment of 
Foreign Sales Corporations: Arbitration Report (30 August 2002) DS108 para 5.
11 See eg Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres [Brazil-Tyres]: Report of 
the Appellate Body (3 December 2007) DS332; European Communities - Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos [EC-Asbestos]: Report of the Appellate Body (12 
March 2001) DS135.
12 See eg United States - Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes [US-
Clove Cigarettes]: Report of the Appellate Body  (4 April 2012) DS406; United States - Meas-
ures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products [US-Tuna II 
(Mexico)]: Report of the Appellate Body  (16 May 2012) DS381;  United States - Certain Country 
of Original Labelling (COOL) Requirements - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and 
Mexico [US-COOL Article 21.5]: Report of the Appellate Body (18 May 2015) DS384 and 386.
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sis. The highlighted issues are especially, but not exclusively, various 
interpretive and normative considerations regarding non-discrimination 
and necessity under the TBT. The last part draws general conclusions.
The aim of this article should not be misunderstood. I do not seek 
to call for the ECtHR to cite or rely on WTO jurisprudence, or the other 
way around (the latter is quasi-impossible in any case, for reasons which 
will be exposed later, especially in the section on WTO dispute settle-
ment essentials.) Neither do I call for WTO tribunals to use the ECtHR 
interpretive approaches and principles, or vice versa. What I primarily in-
tend to do here is to expose interesting similarities between the ECtHR’s 
general use of the concept of margin of appreciation, and the related test 
of proportionality stricto sensu, and the WTO appeal tribunals’ – surpris-
ing – reasoning expressly invoking the margin of appreciation in its last 
ruling under the TBT; and, more generally, I seek to display the growing 
discursive tendency of WTO judges to underline deference to domestic 
regulators under the TBT, which is drawing somewhat closer to the con-
cept of margin of appreciation. The reason I do not make a parallel with 
the domestic administrative law of basically any Continental jurisdiction 
is because the WTO is beyond the level of state law. At this level, it is es-
pecially – but not exclusively – the Strasbourg Court that has developed 
the notion of margin of appreciation into a fully fledged concept which is 
most often used in its jurisprudence.
2. European Convention on Human Rights regime 
2.1 Main highlights related to the ECtHR’s use of margin of 
appreciation
Full explanations of the fundamentals of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights regime have been extensively narrated elsewhere, and there 
is no need for me to do more than just briefly overview the main high-
lights that may directly relate to the subject of this article.
One of the main concepts is the principle of subsidiarity, and its 
particular workings in the ECHR regime. Since its inception, the ECHR 
has been based on the idea that it is primarily its member states that 
are responsible for respecting and enforcing the Convention. Recall that 
the ‘margin of appreciation’ (MoA) means the room for manoeuvre that 
a supra-national organ such as the ECtHR may grant to state authori-
ties in fulfilling their obligations under relevant supra-national instru-
ments. Basically, this means that national authorities, in securing the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, should themselves decide 
democratically what is appropriate for their nation.13 The general con-
13 S Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe Publishing 2000) 5-6.
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ception of MoA is thus analogous to the principle of subsidiarity that is 
especially characteristic of the field of European Union law. The princi-
ple of subsidiarity within the ECHR regime requires that the Strasbourg 
Court intervenes only when the highest court of appeal in the concerned 
member state has not ensured the application of the Convention, or did 
so incompletely.14
I continue with the concept of pilot judgments of the ECHR, as, from 
a particular standpoint, it is an important stepping stone to the actual 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in the European regime of 
human rights. In the pilot-judgment scheme, the Strasbourg Court pro-
vides the concerned state – in addition to the verdict – with clear guidance 
on how to eliminate the malfunction that has been judged by the ECHR 
as the cause of the violation.15 This procedure takes place only when the 
Court receives a significant number of requests from one and the same 
state arising from one and the same cause, thus being a product of struc-
tural problems within the member in question.16 Note this procedure, as 
it will be relevant to understand the later reasoning regarding the opera-
tion of the WTO law regime, and the overall analysis. 
It is important to stress here that passing a judgment and trans-
mitting relevant guidance on how to comply with the Convention is one 
thing, while actually bringing the state in question into compliance is 
a totally different one. As an example, it has been several years since 
the Court issued its first pilot opinion against the UK on the problem 
of the right of prisoners to vote.17 Nothing, however, was undertaken by 
the UK regarding the judgment and the subsequent instructions of the 
ECtHR. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe even offi-
cially called on the British government to implement the related decision 
of the Court.18 However, this call to order was ignored by the UK. And 
it was only then that the ECtHR made a clear point by issuing a new 
pilot judgment (Greens and MT v the United Kingdom), giving London six 
months to comply with the decision to grant prisoners voting rights guar-
anteed by the Convention.
Coming back to my view above that the pilot-judgment procedure 
is important for the effectiveness of subsidiarity in the ECHR regime, 
14 ibid.
15 European Court of Human Rights, ‘The Pilot-Judgment Procedure’ (Information note 
issued by the Registrar 2009) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_pro-
cedure_ENG.pdf> accessed 29 May 2015.
16 ibid.
17 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Prisoner’s Right to Vote’ (Press Unit Factsheet, Feb-
ruary 2015) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Prisoners_vote_ENG.pdf> accessed 
29 May 2015.
18 ibid.
167CYELP 11 [2015] 161-213
if some consider that this scheme intrudes on the policy space of the 
member states (because the latter are supposed to freely apply the judg-
ments of the Court, for example),19 it can still ensure both the actual 
involvement and strengthening of national courts, thus reinforcing sub-
sidiarity. Note that the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thor-
bjørn Jagland, insisted that the pilot-judgment system, in forming part 
of the broader reform of the Court, gave states the means to manage by 
themselves violations committed, so that many cases would not need to 
reach Strasbourg.20 Similar applications can be deferred until the pilot 
judgment in question is implemented. Many applicants now obtain com-
pensation more speedily because remedies are found at national level.21 
The first pilot-judgment intervention concerned the Broniowski v Po-
land row and related cases.22  This row was brought to a successful con-
clusion following the indications that were issued by the ECtHR, and the 
remedies that were introduced. Hence, new legislation was passed and 
pending cases were resolved.23
After a glimpse at the statistics, one cannot in any case help but agree 
with Jagland on the pragmatic aspects of the pilot-judgment scheme and 
its positive effects on subsidiarity. The Council of Europe’s 2011 statistics 
indicate that the number of judgments of the Court fully implemented by 
the contracting states has increased by almost 80% compared to 2010 
(the year of the reform of the Strasbourg Court).24 For the first time in ten 
years, the number of new cases filed has even decreased.25
Now I move directly to the concept of MoA as developed by the ECtHR 
– in pilot-judgments – as well as the regular procedure. In this regime, for 
each case treated, the Strasbourg Court must determine the flexibility, 
or discretion, that the member states have, regarding one or another hu-
19 B Pfiffner and S Bollinger, ‘Ausufernde Interpretation der Menschenrechte’ Neue Zu-
ercher Zeitung (Zürich 2 February 2012) <http://epaper.nzz.ch/nzz/forms/page.htm> ac-
cessed 29 May 2015.
20 Human Rights Europe, ‘Jagland: Human Rights Are Not Getting “Out of Hand”’ (Coun-
cil of Europe 16 February 2012) <http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2012/02/jagland-
human-rights-are-not-%E2%80%9Cgetting-out-of-hand%E2%80%9D/> accessed19 May 
2015.
21 ibid.
22 The so-called Bug River cases: see eg Broniowski v Poland [GC] App no 31443/96 (ECHR 
2004-V). See also Broniowski v Poland (friendly settlement) [GC] App no 31443/96 (ECHR 
2005-IX).
23 See EG v Poland App no 50425/99 and 175 other Bug River Applications (ECHR 23 Sep-
tember 2008).
24 Council of Europe, ‘Execution of Strasbourg Court Judgments: Considerable Progress 
But Concern About Major Structural Problems’ (Press Release DC042, 2012) <https://wcd.
coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=DC-PR042(2012)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CO
E&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE> 
accessed 19 May 2015.
25 ibid.
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man rights issue. In other words, the extent to which a member’s devia-
tion from or restriction of a right guaranteed by the Convention is ‘accept-
able’ given that it is covered by the discretion of states, understood as a 
margin of appreciation for national authorities in the implementation of 
certain obligations put upon them under the ECHR.26
This approach of Strasbourg shows that the Court leaves a wide MoA 
to states on some delicate social issues (mostly of the Western European 
system of values, though), such as abortion, the status of the embryo, or 
the presence of crucifixes in classrooms.27 However, it could be presumed 
that it is more restrictive regarding respect of certain human rights than 
others, as could be seen in the recent decision on the deportation of a 
foreign criminal, for example.28 On the other hand, this dividing line may 
be seen as the Strasbourg Court’s different level of strictness depending 
on the kind of interest of certain member states – eg national security 
issues in the above case on deportation. It also appears more restrictive 
in practice, even if never officially spelled out, regarding non-European-
centric values, such as decisions on religious symbols and clothing – eg 
the wearing of extra-Occidental religious symbols and clothing in educa-
tion institutions.29
The assessment of MoA represents a sort of a compromise, as it ap-
pears to primarily depend on the weighing of the importance of the inter-
ests of parties to the Convention, and of rights protected by the ECHR. As 
already mentioned, the proportionality test stricto sensu is about appreci-
ating the proportionality of the means chosen and the legitimate objective 
that is pursued, and the balancing between two values where either one 
can potentially be ranked higher than the other. That is, while the Court 
assesses the extent to which a deviation from a provision of the ECHR is 
justifiable, the provisions of the Convention themselves obviously do not 
vary. 
Notably, while the pilot-judgment scheme is a relatively recent 
ECtHR practice, it is from its first judgments that the Court introduced 
the principle of subsidiarity inherent in the European mechanism for the 
protection of human rights and recognising that member states have a 
margin of appreciation in how they implement the rights laid down in 
26 See eg Greer (n 13) 4-7.
27 RR v Poland App no 27617/04 (ECHR 26 May 2011); Chamber judgment, Costa and 
Pavan v Italy App no 54270/10 (ECHR 28 August 2012); Chamber judgment Lautsi et al v 
Italy App no 30814/06 (ECGR 18 March 2011).
28 See eg Omar Othman v United Kingdom App no 8139/09 (ECHR17 January 2012). See 
also, generally, E Brems (ed), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights (Intersentia 2008).
29 I am not even talking about the Court’s recent decision regarding the French full veil 
ban, that is, SAS v France, App no 43835/11 (ECHR 1 July 2014). Here the cases that come 
to mind are: Dahlab v Switzerland, 15 February 2001; and especially Mann Singh v France, 
27 November 2008.
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the Convention. Yet, in 1968, it ruled that the ECtHR cannot and should 
not replace relevant national authorities – otherwise, the subsidiary na-
ture of the international mechanism of the collective guarantee of human 
rights established by the Convention would be lost.30 Therefore, national 
authorities remain free to choose the measures they consider appropriate 
in the areas governed by the Convention – the Court’s supervision cov-
ers only the conformity of these measures with the requirements of the 
Convention.31
A few years later, the Strasbourg Court noted that not only is the 
machinery of protection established by the Convention subsidiary to the 
national systems safeguarding human rights systems, but also, and espe-
cially, it is primarily a matter for each member state to ensure enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms the Convention enshrines.32 The institutions 
created by it must contribute in their way, too, but they should become 
involved only through contentious proceedings and after full exhaustion 
of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention.33
These considerations led the ECtHR to recognise that states have an 
MoA in many areas. In a more recent judgment regarding religious signs 
in public places, the Court, for instance, held that, as long as it was not 
part of a form of indoctrination, and given the lack of European consen-
sus on this issue, the choice of putting crucifixes in classrooms in Italy 
remains within the MoA of the latter.34
2.2 Margin of appreciation:  synopsis of the concept
In terms of the legal nature of the notion of ‘margin of appreciation’, 
lawyers – practitioners and academics alike – distinguish between the 
concept, the legal principle, and the doctrine of the margin of apprecia-
tion. The doctrine of margin of appreciation generally refers to the nation-
al margin of appreciation, representing a defined set of principles, and 
means the margin of appreciation that normally only states can benefit 
from.35 In relation to this, the principle of margin of appreciation refers to 
30 ‘The Court points out that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is 
subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights’. Case ‘Relating to Certain 
Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium’ v Belgium (Belgian 
Linguistic case) App no 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, §10 
(ECHR 1968) para 10.
31 ibid.
32 Handyside v The United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECHR 7 December 1976) para 48.
33 ibid.
34 ECtHR, Lautsi et al v Italy
35 S El Boudouhi, ‘A Comparative Approach of the National Margin of Appreciation Doc-
trine Before the ECtHR, Investment Tribunals and WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies’ (April 
2015) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No RSCAS 2015/27, 
1<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625625> accessed 5 July 2015. See also J Kratochvil, ‘The 
170 Anna Aseeva: The Right of States to Regulate in Risk-Averse Areas and the ECtHR Concept...
a material legal rule with a defined legal content, proper for national legal 
systems.36 The concept of margin of appreciation can be seen as an idea 
of discretion or scope of manoeuvre from which states, as well as actors 
inside or beyond states, may benefit.37 Seen as a concept, margin of ap-
preciation is then not necessarily ‘national’, and can also have far greater 
normative flexibility.38 Hence, for reasons of expediency, in this paper I 
will use the term ‘concept’ with relation to margin of appreciation.
The concept of margin of appreciation (Fr marge d’appréciation) has 
been used in different legal configurations. As a specific notion of admin-
istrative law, margin of appreciation has been extensively used by the 
French Conseil d’Etat (‘State Council’), as well as by the German Bundes-
verwaltungsgericht (‘Supreme Administrative Court’), but the equivalent 
legal basis of this concept of administrative discretion can be found in 
every jurisdiction of the civil, or continental, law system.39 In Germany, 
margin of appreciation may also refer to the freedom of parliament in as-
sessing, for example, a situation with regards to national objectives – ie, 
the legislative branch enjoys wide discretion in how to advance the objec-
tives that still form part of written laws and regulations.40
As stated in the introduction, at the level beyond the state, one of 
the first recourses to the MoA concept occurred in 1956 in the case law 
of the ECtHR.41 Since then, recourse to the concept of MoA has become 
a stable, essential and characteristic practice of the Court.42 Interpretive 
criteria have developed during the application of MoA, as have special 
principles related to them which will be discussed in the sections that 
follow.
Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 
29(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 324–357 available at <http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/tablas/r26992.pdf> accessed 13 July 2015; MR Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Apprecia-
tion Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 48 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly, 638-650, as cited in M Hilf and TR Salomon, ‘Margin of Apprecia-
tion Revisited: The Balance Pole of Multilevel Governance’ in M Cremona and others (eds), 
Reflections on the Constitutionalisation of International Economic Law: Liber Amicorum for 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014) 39.
36 ibid. 
37 El Boudouhi (n 35) 1-2.
38 Hilf and Salomon (n 35) 40; El Boudouhi (n 35).
39 See eg Conseil d’Etat <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r11-705/r11-7054.html#fnref11> ac-
cessed 1 September 2015; G Nolte, ‘General Principles of German and European Adminis-
trative Law: A Comparison in Historical Perspective’ (1994) 57 Modern Law 191.
40 Hilf and Salomon (n 35) 41.
41 Greece v United Kingdom (n 5)
42 Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Kluwer 1998) 73-76.
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2.3 Interpretive developments of the margin of appreciation under 
the European Convection on Human Rights
The first two disputes, in which the ECtHR used the MoA – the ‘Cyr-
pus’ case43 and Lawless v Ireland44 – concerned a state of emergency. 
MoA was represented there as exoneration of the state from responsibili-
ties under the Convention in exceptional situations in a time of public 
emergency, thus representing a delicate compromise between conflicting 
considerations of public interest.
In 1968, the ECtHR departed from situations of public emergency as 
typical of the application of MoA. Namely, in the Belgian Linguistics case, 
the Court introduced a wide scope for the emerging application of MoA. 
It established two key criteria for the interpretation of MoA: the propor-
tionality principle, applied in a particular human rights context, and a 
focused consensus standard among member states of the Convention.45
Next followed the Handyside case that laid down the basics of most 
of the criteria for the interpretation and application of MoA, as well as 
special principles related to the concept: subsidiarity; the requirements 
of proportionality; the assessment of necessity in the context of the Con-
vention; the Court’s supervisory function; the principles characterising a 
democratic society; and the notion of pressing social need.46 I will track 
the main highlights of these developments below.
2.3.1 Subsidiarity and the ECtHR’s supervisory function 
As mentioned earlier, the ECHR is based on the idea that it is pri-
marily the signatories of the Convention that are responsible for its re-
spect and enforcement. The principle of subsidiarity is especially charac-
teristic of the field of EU law, where it very generally means that domestic 
authorities should themselves decide democratically what is appropri-
ate for their country (or, since the Lisbon Treaty, even for the region or 
municipality).47 If talking about the idea of subsidiarity beyond the EU, in 
a broader perspective it is not necessarily about national authorities, but 
about making decisions at the ‘lowest’ or most local level.
The principle of subsidiarity within the ECHR regime states that the 
Strasbourg Court can by no means take the place of the national au-
thorities, and may intervene only when the highest court of appeal in the 
43 Greece v United Kingdom  (n 5)
44 Lawless v Ireland App no 332/57 (ECHR 1 July 1961).
45 Belgian linguistic case (n 30) para 10.
46 Handyside (n 32) paras 48-49.
47 The Lisbon Treaty expressly mentions and reinforces this principle in Art 5(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Protocol 2 on the application of the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality.
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concerned state has not ensured the application of the Convention, or has 
done so incompletely.48 The ECtHR supervisory function is a notion con-
nected to subsidiarity, and generally says that the role of the Court is not 
that of the highest court of appeal of a country or of the ‘fourth instance’.49
Particular emphasis was placed on the principle of effective protec-
tion as an essential part of the Convention. Namely, since the supervisory 
meaning of the Convention and the related function of the Strasbourg 
Court is the effective protection of human rights rather than the enforce-
ment of mutual obligations between members of the Convention, the lat-
ter should not be interpreted restrictively in deference to sovereign legis-
lative authority.50
2.3.2 Discrimination and necessity 
As already mentioned, the proportionality principle was introduced 
by the ECtHR in the Belgian Linguistics case. Specifically, in that case, 
the Court defined discrimination as a difference between categories of 
person in the exercise of the Convention rights that has ‘no reasonable 
and objective justification’.51
Later, a distinction was established between ‘different’ treatment 
that is not discriminatory, meaning that interferences involving such 
treatment are permissible under the Convention, and discriminatory 
treatment properly speaking. In a series of decisions, the Court developed 
a wide scope for the emerging concept of MoA regarding, in particular, 
the reasonableness of a restriction placed by a member state on a right 
guaranteed by the Convention – and, four general factors have emerged 
as guidelines for establishing discrimination:52
(i) the treatment in question is less favourable than that received 
by other comparable groups, the identity of which will usually be 
determined objectively by the complaint itself;53
(ii) the practice is unreasonable (reasons presented by the authori-
ties are judged irrelevant and insufficient) and irrational (the 
means-end test shows that it is a disproportionate response to 
the need);54
48 Handyside (n 32) para 48. See also  Greer (n 13) 37; R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The 
Law of Human Rights (OUP 2000) 284-86.
49 Greer (n 13); Jagland, Human Rights Europe (n 20).
50 Greer (n 13) 15.
51 Belgian n 30) 1 dges, as well as urter Iback to me to see what we can shorten. way it was 
used by world trade judges, as well as urter I Linguistic case (n 30) para 10.
52 Based on Greer (n 13) 37.
53 Abdulaziz, Cabales, Balkandali v the United Kingdom App no 9214/80; 9473/81; 
9474/81 (ECHR 28 May 1985) para 74.
54 Abdulaziz (n 53) paras 74-84. See also Malone v The United Kingdom App  no 8691/79 
(ECHR 2 August1984); Silver v The United Kingdom App  no 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 
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(iii) the effects of the treatment are disproportionate in relation to the 
pursuit of the policy objective and fail to strike a balance between 
the protection of the interests of the community and respect for 
the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention;55
(iv) the fourth factor actually determines the scope of the MoA: 
whether the practice in question is regarded as non-discrimina-
tory in other democratic states.56
Note that, when assessing the necessity of different treatment as a 
distinction between categories in the exercise of Convention rights that 
is claimed to have reasonable and objective justification, the Court must 
evaluate whether or not such a ‘pressing social need’ exists.57 In this as-
sessment, national authorities are allowed an MoA. It is in fact the evalu-
ation of democratic necessity that lays down one of the already mentioned 
fundamental principles of interpretation, that is, the principle of propor-
tionality.58 Namely, the proportionality test stricto sensu involves weigh-
ing and balancing between a pressing social need for some restriction of 
the Convention and a proportionate response to that need through such 
a restriction. This also involves assessing whether the reasons presented 
by the government are relevant and sufficient for this restriction to be 
non-discriminatory and necessary.
All in all, a treatment that is different for some categories in the ex-
ercise of Convention rights must be deemed discriminatory if it is proved 
unnecessary.
2.3.3 A particular standard of ‘European consensus’
The last interpretative factors and principles of the previous section, 
namely, the ‘pressing social need’ factor, the subsequent principle of the 
evaluation of democratic necessity, as well as the englobing principle of 
whether the practice in question is regarded as non-discriminatory in 
other democratic states, together introduce a particular notion of ‘Euro-
pean consensus’ inside the ECHR regime.59
The ECtHR applies more often a teleological interpretation based on 
observed consensus rather than the intent of the drafters; the ‘European 
7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (ECHR 23 March1983); Sunday Times v The United 
Kingdom App  no 6538/74, (ECHR 26 April 1979); Muller v Switzerland App  no 10737/84 
(ECHR  24 May1988); and Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs und Gubi v 
Austria App no 15153/89 (ECHR 19 December 1994).
55 Belgian Linguistic case (n 30) paras.34-35.
56 Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECHR 13 June 1979), para 41. 
57 Handyside (n 32) paras 48-49.
58 RA Lawson and HGSchermers, Leading Cases of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ArsAequiLibri 1997) 29-40.
59 Marckx v Belgium (n 56) para 41; Handyside (n 32) paras 48-49. See also Greer (n 13) 11.
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Consensus’ standard could thus be seen as a generic term used to de-
scribe the Court’s enquiry into the existence or non-existence of a com-
mon ground, mostly in the law and practice of the contracting states.60
As the ECtHR ruled in the Handyside case, for instance, given that 
the legitimate objective was the protection of public morals, it did not 
manage to find a uniform conception of morals in the domestic law of 
the various member states because ‘the requirements of morals varies 
from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is 
characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the 
subject’.61
Therefore, one may conclude that the non-existence of a European 
consensus on the subject-matter would imply a wider MoA accorded to 
the signatory state in question. 
3 The world trade regime in a nutshell
Comprehensive historical and conceptual accounts of the GATT/
WTO regime have been chronicled elsewhere, and there is no need here 
to do more than concisely sketch some of its highlights. In this part, I 
outline the most general legislative as well as some key jurisprudential 
developments.
3.1 The GATT/WTO basics
The fundamental principles of the trading system as laid down by 
the GATT 1947 (now integrated into the GATT 1994 by reference), and 
taken over by the WTO at its creation in 1995, are the following:
(i) Gradual market liberalisation. Trade agreements do not end 
but must evolve over time. Continuing negotiations is a binding 
commitment made by a GATT member state at the moment of 
the signature of the GATT agreement.
(ii) Most-favoured-nation (MFN). Under the GATT/WTO agree-
ments, members cannot in principle discriminate between their 
trading partners. If a member accords a special favour to ‘like’ 
imported goods from one country, it has to do the same for all 
WTO members. This principle is the first article of the GATT, 
60 I de la Rasilla del Moral, ‘The Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of the Margin of Ap-
preciation Doctrine’ (2006) 7(6) German Law Journal 617. See also R St J MacDonald, 
‘The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1992) 1 (book 2) Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law, 95, 124, cited in Greer (n 13); Rudolf Bernhardt, 
‘Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human-Rights Treaties’ in Franz Matscher and Herbert 
Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in Honour of Gé-
rard J. Wiarda (Carl Heymans Verlag 1988) 65-67, 80-86.
61 Handyside (n 32) para 48. 
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which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a priority under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article II, with 
some differences that are not relevant for my analysis, as the 
GATS is outside its scope.62
(iii) National treatment (NT). ‘Like’ imported and locally produced 
goods should be treated equally. NT only applies once a given 
trade object has entered the market. The principle of NT is found 
in all the main WTO agreements (eg GATT Article III, GATS Ar-
ticle XVII, SPS Article 2.3, TBT Article 2.1, etc), although the 
exact application of this principle slightly varies under each of 
the relevant agreements.63
Together, the MFN and NT principles and corresponding provisions 
in the GATT and other WTO agreements represent the non-discrimina-
tion norm of the GATT/WTO regime. The non-discrimination norm is so 
far the sole constraint on inward-oriented domestic measures under the 
original GATT.64Notably, the concept of ‘like products’ within the GATT/
WTO regarding the non-discrimination provisions has a very particu-
lar meaning and particular criteria to determine each particular kind of 
measure. This is largely because the concept of ‘likeness’ was not defined 
in the GATT, but has been elaborated on a case-by-case basis.65 For ex-
ample, the definition of criteria for products to be judged ‘like’ differs 
depending on whether the measure applying to the products in question 
is an internal taxation (GATT Article III:2) or an internal regulation (GATT 
Article III:4). GATT and other WTO provisions relevant for my analysis 
are those applying to domestic regulations. The elements of the widely 
used non-discrimination test are the following: a measure should be an 
internal regulation affecting ‘like’ products, and under this regulation 
imports should not be accorded ‘less favourable treatment’ than ‘like’ 
domestic products. In the famous EC-Asbestos case, the WTO Appellate 
Body, essentially drawing on the Border Tax Adjustments Report,66 reviewed 
62 Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 288-291.
63 WTO, ‘Principles of the Trading System’ < https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/fact2_e.htm > accessed 29 June 2015.
64 See eg A Porges and JP Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resur-
rection of Aim and Effects” (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 783, 783-84. See also T Cot-
tier, ‘Sovereign Equality and Graduation in International Economic Law’ in M Cremona and 
others (eds), Reflections on the Constitutionalisation of International Economic Law. Liber 
Amicorum for Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014) 219.
65 For an excellent overview, see RE Hudec, ‘“Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in 
GATT Articles I and III” in T Cottier and P Mavroidis (eds), Regulatory Barriers and the Prin-
ciple of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law (University of Michigan Press 2000) 107-15. 
See also Cottier (n 64).
66 GATT Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, 2 December 1970, GATT BISD 
(18th Supp) 97ff.
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and established the four factors of likeness based on the market logic as 
follows: physical characteristics, end use, consumer tastes and habits, 
and tariff classification.67 The EC-Asbestos case will be explored in detail 
in the relevant sections that follow.
3.2 Article XX of the GATT: departure from free trade obligations 
Here, the approaches used by world trade adjudicators can be very 
roughly divided into ‘before’ and ‘after’ the creation of the WTO.
3.2.1 The main and relevant interpretative lines under GATT Article XX 
Under the GATT, even if a measure of a member is deemed to violate 
the above principles, it might still be consistent with the GATT if that meas-
ure falls under one of the exceptions of GATT Article XX. Again, complete 
explanations of the fundamentals of GATT Article XX have been extensively 
narrated elsewhere,68 and there is no need for me to do more than briefly 
outline the main highlights that may directly relate to domestic regulations 
with societal objectives. Therefore, the analysis that follows concerns the 
two provisions of Article XX, which are the most relevant for my analysis: 
exceptions that concern human, animal and plant life and health (Article 
XX (b)) and environmental measures (Article XX (g)).
The analysis of the consistency of a measure under GATT Article XX 
is two-tiered.69 First, the subsections of Article XX relevant for domestic 
measures that I will address under the TBT could allow otherwise incon-
sistent trade restrictions if they are ‘necessary’ to protect human, animal, 
or plant life or health (XX(b)) or if they are ‘relating to’ the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources (XX(g)). Second, even if Article XX con-
ditions are met in accordance with one of mentioned paragraphs, the 
measure must yet fulfil the requirements of the Article XX introductory 
clause (the so-called chapeau). That is, it should be established that such 
67 EC-Asbestos (n 11) para101.
68 To quote just a few, see eg S Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in 
GATT Article XX’ (1991) 25 Journal of World Trade 37-55; H Horn and P Mavroidis, ‘EC-
Asbestos’ in H Horn and P Mavroidis (eds), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies: 
The WTO Case Law (CUP 2007-2008) 27-53; M McRae, ‘GATT Article XX and the WTO Ap-
pellate Body’ in M Bronckers and R Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic 
Law: Essays in Honour of John H Jackson (Kluwer Law International 2000); L Ehring, ‘The 
EU Approach to Article XX GATT Case-Law’, paper presented at the SIEL 2014 Bern Global 
Conference, 10 July 2014, World Trade Institute, University of Bern.
69 For comprehensive accounts of the Article XX GATT application, see eg J Jackson, W 
Davey and A Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and 
Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations (6th edn, 
Thomson/West 2013) 591-610; Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 339-404; Mavroidis et al (n 1) 
684-724. For its application on environment-related measures, see eg International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), ‘Competitiveness and Climate Policies: Is 
There a Case for Restrictive Unilateral Trade Measures?’ (2009) ICTSD Programme on Com-
petitiveness and Sustainable Development, Information Note No 16.
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a restriction is not a means of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ 
or a ‘disguised restriction on trade’, as specified in the chapeau. 
Regarding GATT Article XX(b), in order to appreciate whether pos-
sible violations of the above GATT obligations would be justified by the 
exception under this provision, a panel will have to analyse: (i) whether 
the policy falls within the range of measures designed to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; (ii) and the meaning of ‘necessary’, there-
fore verifying whether the policy fulfils the criteria for being ‘necessary’ 
as laid down by the GATT and interpreted and applied by the WTO DSB.
As for the notion of necessity under XX(b), in sum, the word ‘nec-
essary’ is not limited to the term absolute necessity. Determination of 
whether a measure (which is not indispensable) is ‘necessary’ involves 
weighing such factors as: (i) the contribution of the measure to the ends 
pursued (the ‘means-end’ test);70 (ii) the importance of the common inter-
ests or values protected;71 and (iii) the overall impact of the measure (the 
‘effects’ test). In respect of the appreciation of necessity, it is interesting to 
note that it may be used by WTO panels as a particularly convenient and 
important juridical instrument when dealing with domestic regulation, as 
it allows them to differentiate between regulations that have an inadvert-
ent and inevitable negative impact on trade, and regulations that have 
an unintended but avoidable trade-distorting impact.72 While the latter is 
not justifiable under XX(b), the former might be justifiable because it is 
‘necessary’, as it is otherwise simply inevitable. 
A general opinion exists that countries seeking to justify various 
socially imperative policies related to human health, but doing so indi-
rectly, would rather resort to Article XX(g) than (b).73 One of the reasons, 
it is claimed, is that the requirement ‘necessary’ in Article XX (b) is gen-
erally perceived as more strict, and thus more difficult to meet than the 
requirement of ‘relating to’ in Article XX(g); furthermore, following this 
logic, commentators often prefer to defend measures that can fall un-
der both of these provisions under Article XX(g).74 The lines that follow 
briefly consider the common trends of WTO case law relevant for Article 
XX(g) GATT.
According to the US-Gasoline ruling, this ‘relating to’ test requires 
that there must be a substantial relationship between the regulation and 
70 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products [US-Shrimp]: Report of 
the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) DS58, para141; Brazil-Tyres (n 11) para 93.
71 EC-Asbestos (n 11) para 115.
72 A Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism (CUP 2011) 265.
73 See Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 339-404. See also L Bartels, ‘The Inclusion of Aviation 
in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations’ (2012) 6 ICTSD Trade and Sustainable Energy 
Series (April 2012) 15.
74 Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3). .
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the public interest objective,75 eg an environmental regulation and the 
conservation of the planet’s atmosphere. In like manner, as held in US-
Shrimp, it is required that the ‘means [should be] related to the ends’,76 ie 
that the measure must be expressly designed to contribute to attaining 
an environmental goal. In addition, there should be a sufficient juris-
dictional nexus for the measure.77 Finally, the regulation must be taken 
in conjunction with the restrictions on relevant domestic production or 
consumption.78
In this respect, consider the example of the atmosphere. In US-Gas-
oline, both the panel and the AB determined that clean air was an ex-
haustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g) GATT.79 
Although the atmosphere and clean air are not synonymous, it would 
however seem consistent to consider the atmosphere as an exhaustible 
natural resource, too.80 With regard to the close relationship between the 
means and the ends, as well as a jurisdictional nexus, the atmosphere, 
just like the air, is everywhere.81 So, in this example, countless inward-
oriented domestic measures with an inadvertent extra-territorial effect 
somehow related to the fight against climate change and for the conser-
vation of the atmosphere are likely to be justifiable under Article XX.
The next step is an assessment of the measure’s conformity with the 
requirements of the chapeau. The measures under any of the paragraphs 
of GATT Article XX should be examined against the background of the 
general chapeau’s criteria, which were introduced in the AB’s first ever 
decision, and were confirmed in subsequent rulings: (i) ‘arbitrary dis-
crimination’ (between countries where the same conditions prevail); (ii) 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ (with the same qualifier); and (iii) ‘disguised 
75 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gas [US-Gasoline]: Report 
of the Panel  (29 January 1996) DS2, para 6.37. See also United States-Standards for Refor-
mulated and Conventional Gas [US-Gasoline]: Report of the Appellate Body (20 May 1996) DS58. 
Unlike current AB reports, this early report does not feature numbered paragraphs.
76 US-Shrimp (n 70) para141.
77 ibid, paras133 and 137.
78 US-Gasoline (n 75); US-Shrimp (n 70) paras133-45.
79 See eg US-Gasoline (n 75) para 6.36.
80 See eg J Meltzer, ‘Climate Change and Trade: The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO’ 
(2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 111, 141-142; W Maruyama, ‘Climate 
Change and the WTO: Cap and Trade Versus Carbon Tax’ (2011) 45 Journal of World 
Trade, 679, 695; J Pauwelyn, ‘US Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: 
The Limits and Options of International Trade Law’ (2007) 38 ICTSD Programme on Trade 
and Environment, 35; R Howse and A Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to 
Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal Issues’ in T Cottier, O Nartova and 
S Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change  (CUP 
2009) 61. 
81 See also R Howse commenting on L Bartels: namely, Howse keenly pointed out that ‘cli-
mate change is a global problem with effects everywhere’. In Bartels (n 73) 29.
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restriction’ on international trade.82 To these general conditions an as-
sessment of the design of the measure itself, as well as its application (ie 
whether it is just restrictive or discriminatory) should be added,83 and also 
whether the external reasons may explain this differential treatment.84
As to the chapeau test for environmental and health measures, in 
previous disputes the AB has already elaborated on the content of such 
criteria.85 The most relevant for the environmental and health measures 
criteria include the following: 
(i) Does the measure take into account the local conditions in for-
eign countries or does it essentially require foreign countries to 
adopt their own policies?
(ii) Before imposing unilateral environmental measures, did the 
country in question engage in serious, across-the-board nego-
tiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral 
agreements to address climate change? (It may be that the cha-
peau demands the concerned state to undertake efforts to ne-
gotiate an international agreement as a precondition to the fall-
back of unilateral measures.)86 However, according to US-Shrimp, 
this does not require the actual conclusion of an agreement.87
(iii) Does the implementation and administration of the measure re-
spect basic fairness and due process? More specifically, any dis-
crimination in the application of the conflicting measure should 
‘relate to the pursuit of the measure’.88
3.2.2 Relevant GATT jurisprudence 
For the most part, unilateral measures that might somehow restrict 
trade, even if advancing societal causes, have initially hardly been toler-
ated by the enforcement of the rules and norms of the world trade regime. 
The most relevant rulings issued under the ‘old regime’, namely be-
fore the creation of the WTO in 1995, are US-Tuna (Canada), Canada-Her-
82 US-Gasoline (n 75) 23. See also relevant reasoning in US-Shrimp (n 70), EC-Asbestos (n 
11) and Brazil-Tyres (n 11).
83 Brazil-Tyres (n 11) para 246.
84 ibid. See eg paras145-6, 150-1, 154, 232-3 and 247. See also European Communities 
- Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products [EC-Seals]: Report of the 
Appellate Body (22 May 2014) DS400 paras 5.208-215.
85 For a comprehensive overview of the chapeau principles and the criteria to meet for 
there to be a justified exception, in particular regarding ‘good faith’, see O Perez, Ecological 
Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment Conflict (Hart 
Publishing 2004) 82-83; Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 391.
86 US-Gasoline (n 75) paras 27-28. 
87 US-Shrimp (n 70) paras 122-123.
88 Brazil-Tyres (n 11) para 93.
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ring, Canada-Ice Cream, Thailand-Cigarettes, US-Taxes on Automobiles, 
and two Tuna-Dolphin disputes – mainly because they all looked at GATT 
Article XX public policy exceptions.
In the seven cases, GATT panels had to interpret the exceptions in-
voked as a justification of a party’s otherwise discriminatory measures 
related to national social imperatives. And in all cases, the panels per-
formed quite a narrow analysis of GATT exceptions.89
In particular, in the Canada-Ice Cream case, a GATT panel set the 
benchmark at which GATT public policy exceptions were to be interpret-
ed – ie narrowly:
a contracting party invoking an exception to the General 
Agreement [not only] bore the burden of proving that it had 
met all of the conditions of that exception […], [but also] that 
exceptions were to be interpreted narrowly.90
In 1990, in the Thailand-Cigarettes case, Thailand argued that its 
import restrictions on US cigarette imports were justified under GATT 
Article XX(b) because the government had adopted measures that could 
only be effective if cigarette imports were prohibited and because chemi-
cals and other additives contained in US cigarettes might make them 
more harmful than Thai cigarettes.91 Notably, the panel stated ‘that GATT 
XX(b) clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health 
over trade liberalisation; however, for a measure to be covered by Article 
XX(b) it had to be “necessary”’ (emphasis added).92 The panel eventually 
ruled that Thailand’s import restrictions were not ‘necessary’ within the 
meaning of Article XX(b).
The most notable of the pre-WTO disputes was the Tuna row. The 
first Tuna case was brought to the GATT in 1991. Mexico challenged the 
US Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibiting the ‘taking’ (‘har-
assment, hunting, capture, killing or attempt to do any of these’), and 
importation into the US of marine mammals, in particular the taking of 
marine mammals incidental to harvesting yellowfin tuna in the Eastern 
89 United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada: Report of 
the Panel (22 February 1982) L/5198-29S/91, 108; Canada - Measures Affecting Exports 
of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon: Report of the Panel  (22 March 1988) L/6268-35S/98, 
113; Canada — Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt (BISD 36S/68), adopted at 
the Forty-fifth Session of the contracting parties (5 December 1989) L/6568 - 36S/68, see 
eg paras 8-17, 30-31; United States — Taxes on Automobiles: Report of the Panel DS31/R, 
unadopted, circulated on 11 October 1994, see eg paras 5.56-5.57, 5.59-5.66.
90 Canada-Ice Cream (n 89) para 59.
91 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes: Report of the 
Panel (7 November 1990) DS10/R-37S/200.
92 Thailand-Cigarettes (n 91) para 73.
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Tropical Pacific Ocean, an area where dolphins are known to swim above 
schools of tuna. The act meant embargoes on the imports of tuna that 
had been caught with commercial fishing technology resulting in the inci-
dental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of US 
standards.93 The second Tuna dispute was initiated by the Netherlands 
and the EC complaining that both the primary and the intermediary na-
tion embargoes, enforced pursuant to the MMPA, violated GATT Article 
XI:1 and were not covered by any of the exceptions of Article XX.94
In both Tuna – Dolphin cases, the question relevant to this section 
for response by the GATT panels was whether the two otherwise ‘like’ 
products were actually not ‘like’ because of the difference in their process 
and production method (PPM).95 The essential rationale of the PPM issue 
vis-à-vis the trade law is whether the ‘like’ products with a different PPM 
could be treated differently by the parties to the world trade regime. The 
relevant – though not exclusive – idea behind the PPM conception relat-
ing to GATT Article XX refers to the processes that may somehow have 
harmful side effects: eg, they may affect the environment, the health and 
life of human and other living beings, human security, morals, etc, dur-
ing the production of a good, while the final product may be perfectly 
similar to other products of that group. In the Tuna – Dolphin disputes, it 
was the way in which the conflicting US regulations required the fishing 
of tuna to be carried out.96 The answer that both Tuna panels found to 
the above question regarding different PPMs for otherwise ‘like’ products 
was ‘no’: no, under GATT rules on national treatment and quantitative 
restrictions, the US could not treat the same tuna in a different manner 
because of differences in its harvesting.97
As regards GATT exceptions, the panels proceeded as follows. In Tu-
na-Dolphin I, the US argued that the measure in question intending to 
promote foreign environmental conservation was covered by GATT Arti-
cles XX(b) and (g). The GATT panel expressed fear that any justification 
under Article XX might lead to ‘green protectionism’.98 So the panel con-
siderably reduced the scope of application of the provisions by excluding 
93 Based on WTO, ‘Environment < https://www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/envir_e/
edis04_e.htm > accessed 31 May 2014.
94 ibid.
95 United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna [Tuna-Dolphin I]: Report of the Panel, 
unadopted, circulated on 3 September 1991, eg paras 5.7-5.10; United States — Restrictions 
on Imports of Tuna [Tuna-Dolphin II]: Report of the Panel, unadopted, circulated on 19 June 
1994, eg paras 5.7-5.9.
96 Tuna-Dolphin I (n 95) paras 5.9-5.15; Tuna-Dolphin II (n 95) para 5.9. 
97 Tuna-Dolphin I (n 95) paras 5.15-16 and 5.18; Tuna-Dolphin II (n 95) paras 5.8-5.10.
98 See D C Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Institute for In-
ternational Economics 1994) as cited in A Peters and others ‘The Constitutionalisation of 
International Trade Law’ in T Cottier and P Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International 
Trade Regulation. From Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP 2011) 85.
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practically all unilateral trade measures.99 This was mostly because they 
were unilateral measures and trade measures, rather than because they 
were socially imperative ones. The destiny of the US claims for justifica-
tions under GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) in Tuna – Dolphin II was the same 
– all less restrictive options had first to be pursued before imposing such 
a trade restrictive measure.100 As regards necessity (the criterion to be ap-
plied under GATT XX(b)) and primary aim (the relevant criterion of GATT 
XX(g)) of the US regulation, in both disputes the panels decided that the 
conflicting measures could not be deemed as either ‘primarily aimed’ at 
the conservation of dolphins, or ‘necessary’ for the protection of their 
life. It is important to stress here that, basically until the EC-Asbestos 
dispute, the standard of review under GATT Article XX adopted by world 
trade tribunals was symmetrical across various provisions of the arti-
cle.101 Namely, the adjudicators were paying attention to the means used 
to meet a certain societal objective rather than examining the legitimacy 
of the ends of such an objective.102 Hence there were parallel standards of 
review, eg under both ‘necessary’ and ‘primarily aimed’, in earlier GATT/
WTO cases. As mentioned, the situation changed after the AB ruling in 
EC-Asbestos, where it held that the legitimacy of each particular objec-
tive in question should be assessed (in this case, under the ‘necessary’ 
standard of review only).103
It is interesting to note that neither of the two Tuna panels examined 
the legality of the conflicting regulation with regard to world trade law 
through the application of the chapeau of GATT Article XX. Moreover, 
none of the panels settling the other three relevant GATT disputes dealing 
with the environmental issues under GATT Article XX(g) (US-Tuna (Cana-
da), Canada-Herring, US-Taxes on Automobiles), and the one applying Ar-
ticle XX on health measures (Thailand-Cigarettes), completed the analysis 
by continuing with the chapeau application in the cases at hand.
Notably, the two (though unadopted – hence without the status of a 
legal interpretation of GATT law) Tuna panel reports marked the begin-
ning of a new era of adjudication in the global trade regime, namely that 
of the ‘trade and…’ debate. Around 1995, following the relevant rulings, 
the ‘trade’ side outweighed the ‘and…’ side, as the public interest objec-
tives of one member clearly could not prevail over the free trade objectives 
of the trading community as a whole. The GATT legal standards of non-
99 Tuna-Dolphin I (n 95) paras 5.8-5.14; 5.27.
100 Tuna-Dolphin II (n 95) paras 5.8-5.9.
101 See eg US-Taxes on Automobiles (n 89) paras 5.56-5.57; 5.59-5.66; Korea - Measures Af-
fecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef [Korea-Beef]: Report of the Appellate Body 
(11 December 2000) DS161, para 176.
102 Mavroidis et al (n 1) 691.
103 EC-Asbestos (n 11) 172.
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discrimination were not balanced against competing non-trade stand-
ards and interests – rather, a clear hierarchy of structural values of the 
GATT was underlined: the non-discrimination rules first, and the public 
policy exceptions after.104
3.2.3 Relevant WTO jurisprudence
Right after the inception of the WTO, the three decisions on the cases 
that followed considerably changed the direction of the ‘trade and…’ de-
bate. So, in order to demonstrate quite a sharp contrast in the interpre-
tation of world trade law applying to domestic societal regulation, I will 
concentrate on the first three relevant rulings by the WTO DSB, though 
occasionally referring to different later disputes where relevant. My gen-
eral aim here is not to discuss at length the totality of WTO jurisprudence 
under GATT Article XX, but to track the main highlights of WTO rulings 
deciding on domestic societal regulation under the GATT that might be 
relevant for my analysis of TBT case law. Indeed, law and its application 
do not remain static but naturally evolve over time – not only within the 
GATT/WTO, but basically in any legal regime. Therefore, my methodolog-
ical option is rather to address earlier relevant decisions under the WTO. 
The main reason for such a selection is that, otherwise, the interpretive 
choices and attitudes in cases with twenty to thirty years between them 
are unsurprisingly very different anyway. That is, more recent decisions 
would be more up-to-date and would better correspond to their actuality 
and related current events, whatever the latter are. Discussing judicial 
decisions with only a few years between them, as I do here, but still with 
quite different interpretative politics, seems to me to be more illustrative.
The first is the US-Gasoline case. In January 1995, Venezuela com-
plained to the newly created WTO DSB that the US was applying rules 
that discriminated against Venezuelan gasoline imports. The case arose 
because of the Gasoline Rule under the US Clean Air Act that set out the 
rules for establishing baseline figures (an average standard) for gasoline 
sold on the US market. The Gasoline Rule was applicable to refiners, 
blenders and importers of the product, and required that certain chemical 
characteristics of the gasoline in which they dealt respect, on an annual 
average basis, defined levels. Some of these levels were fixed, and oth-
ers were expressed as ‘non-degradation’ requirements.105 This translated 
into stricter requirements for the chemical characteristics of imported 
gasoline than for domestically-refined gasoline. The stated purpose of 
this provision was to regulate the composition and emission effects of 
104 In this sense, see similar conclusions in Perez (n 85) 54. See also Guzman and Pauwelyn 
(n 3) 283.
105 US-Gasoline (n 75) para 6.2ff.
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gasoline so as to prevent air pollution.106 Venezuela (and later Brazil) said 
it violated the NT principle and could not be justified under exceptions to 
the GATT rules for health and environmental conservation measures.107
Established for the first time under the WTO, the panel found that 
the measure treated imported gasoline less favourably than domestically 
refined gasoline. It thus violated the NT provision. In particular, under 
the measure at issue, the statutory baseline had no connection to the 
particular gasoline imported, while refiners of domestic gasoline had only 
to meet a standard linked to their own product in 1990, a different, in-
dividual refinery baseline.108 Regarding the exceptions, the panel consid-
ered the case under three provisions of GATT Article XX (as per US sub-
missions): (b), (d), and (g).109 Given that the most relevant one was GATT 
XX(g), the panel examined in detail whether clean air was an exhaustive 
natural resource.110 It concluded that it was, but that, overall, the US 
measure did not benefit from the Article XX exception – either under 
paragraph (g), or the other two.111
Regarding the application of general exceptions, the AB adjusted the 
panel’s interpretation. Namely, it held regarding the exception at hand 
– the conservation of exhaustible natural resources under GATT Article 
XX(g) – that, instead of relying on the relevant reasoning of earlier (GATT) 
panels, the panel should have interpreted ‘measures’ more broadly under 
Article XX to include provisions not themselves found inconsistent with 
Article III:4.112 The AB further detailed that the ‘measure’, ie the baseline 
establishment rules, and not the ‘less favourable treatment’ (as the panel 
held), was “primarily aimed at” (related to) the conservation of exhaust-
ible natural resources, but still concluding that Article XX(g) was not 
applicable in this case.113 As I have already mentioned above, the ‘relat-
ing to’ test requires that there be a substantive relationship between the 
conflicting measure and the public interest objective, ie an environmen-
tal regulation should clearly relate to the conservation of an exhaust-
106 As already mentioned, unlike current AB reports, this very first report does not fea-
ture numbered paragraphs. Therefore, see directly US-Gasoline (n 75). See also WTO, ‘WTO 
Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries’ (2012) 7 < http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm > accessed 31 May 2014.
107 ibid.
108 US-Gasoline, paras 6.5-6.17.
109 ibid, para 6.20ff.
110 ibid, para 6.37.
111 ibid, paras 6.37 and 6.41.
112 It held that there ‘was no need at all to examine whether the whole of the Gasoline Rule 
or any of its other rules was saved or justified by Article XX(g). The Panel here was following 
the practice of earlier panels in applying Article XX to provisions found to be inconsistent 
with Article III:4: the “measures” to be analyzed under Article XX are the same provisions 
infringing Article III:4’. US-Gasoline (n 75) 13-14.
113 ibid, 14ff.
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ible natural resource. Notably, in this case, both the panel and the AB 
determined that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource within the 
meaning of GATT Article XX(g).
In its very first decision, the AB introduced a number of other land-
mark concepts and interpretive principles that were used and comple-
mented in subsequent disputes. One of them is the concept of ‘calibrated 
measures’: the regulation must be taken in conjunction with the restric-
tions on relevant domestic production or consumption. A connected 
concept is the requirement of ‘even-handedness’ in the imposition of re-
strictions, even if in the name of the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural 
resources.114Another one is the empirical ‘effects test’: the AB noted that 
in the first place, the problem of determining causation, well-
known in both domestic and international law, is always a 
difficult one. In the second place, in the field of conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period 
of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects 
attributable to implementation of a given measure may be 
observable.115
The AB also noted that, under the chapeau of GATT Article XX, ‘good 
faith’ in the GATT/WTO context implied that a conflicting measure was not 
a means of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restric-
tion to trade’. (Generally, in law, and in particular in traditional interna-
tional law, the concept of good faith (or bona fide) is one of the principles 
underlying the legal doctrine of ‘abus de droit’: together with the two other 
principles, ie fairness and justice, it aims at preventing the actual abusive 
exercise by a legal subject of its own legal right – that is, when a right is 
formally exercised in conformity with the conditions laid down in the rule 
granting the right, but where the legal outcome is against the objective of 
that rule, the objective of that rule thus not being achieved.116) 
Eventually, regarding the legality of the disputed US measure vis-à-
vis the chapeau, the AB concluded that a failure to negotiate in good faith 
and seek the cooperation of foreign states amounted to unjustifiable dis-
crimination and disguised restriction on international trade and hence 
failed to satisfy the chapeau’s criteria of good faith.117 
114 ibid, 21.
115 ibid.
116 For civil law, see D Johnston, Roman Law in Context (CUP 1999) 71-76. For common 
law, see eg JG  Fleming, The Law of Torts (8th edn, The Law Book Company 1992) 623. For 
public international law, see eg A Kiss, ‘Abuse of Rights’  in R Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (vol 1, North-Holland 1992) 4.
117 US-Gasoline (n 75) 22ff.
186 Anna Aseeva: The Right of States to Regulate in Risk-Averse Areas and the ECtHR Concept...
The second relevant incident happened in early 1997 when India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand brought a joint complaint against a ban 
imposed by the US on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp 
products. A ban was imposed on shrimp caught without a ‘turtle exclud-
ing device’ (TED) – this applied initially to catch from the western hemi-
sphere and, subsequently, worldwide. The protection of sea turtles was 
at the heart of the ban. The US Endangered Species Act of 1973 listed 
as endangered or threatened the five species of sea turtles that occur in 
US waters, and prohibited their ‘take’ within the US, in its territorial sea 
and the high seas.118 In 1998, when deciding the US-Shrimp case, the AB 
acknowledged that the referred state public policy exception could be 
excused under relevant paragraphs of GATT Article XX as this concerned 
an exhaustible natural resource, but eventually could not be considered 
justified or non-arbitrary under the chapeau.119
By insisting that identical conservation schemes be adopted abroad, 
the US unilateral implementation of uniform trade measures was char-
acterised as clearly prescribing compliance with, or adoption of, certain 
polices to other WTO members, and though not prohibited by the GATT, 
this simply could not be tolerated by the world trading regime.120 Never-
theless, US-Shrimp became a landmark case where the WTO AB rejected 
the narrow interpretation of the exceptions applied to the socially impera-
tive regulations of the state, laid down by the GATT panels in the two 
Tuna cases. Namely, measures falling under the scope of the subsections 
of GATT Article XX were ‘recognised as exceptions to substantive obliga-
tions’ under the GATT/WTO system as the corresponding policies ‘have 
been recognised as important and legitimate in character’.121 However, 
such measures would still need to be established as non-protectionist, 
that is, to pass the test of the chapeau of Article XX.
In order not to miss the full importance of the AB’s ruling in this 
case, it is important to emphasise several points. First, in its report, the 
AB made clear that under WTO rules, countries have the right to take 
trade action to protect the environment (in particular, human, animal or 
plant life and health) and endangered species and exhaustible resourc-
es.122 The WTO does not have to ‘allow’ them this right, as it does not 
have such wide discretion.123 It also said that measures to protect sea 
turtles would be legitimate under GATT Article XX that deals with vari-
118 Based on WTO, summary of the US-Shrimp case <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm>  accessed 31 May 2015.
119 US-Shrimp (n 70) paras 161-163.
120 ibid, para121.
121 ibid, para 121.
122 ibid, paras 133 and 161.
123 ibid, para 161.
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ous exceptions to the WTO’s trade rules, provided certain criteria such as 
non-discrimination were met.124
Thirdly, the panel working on this case before the appeal actually 
tried to bring back the narrow vision of GATT exceptions. It attempted to 
do so through something that the two GATT Tuna panels omitted to do – 
ie by applying the chapeau. Nevertheless, the message of the US-Shrimp 
panel was the same as that of the GATT era panels: members’ domestic 
measures of a ‘lower’ – eg environmental – order that compete with the 
world trade rules, and which therefore affect the multilateral trading re-
gime as a whole, should not even be considered under GATT Article XX 
(this time, its chapeau).125 The AB reversed this application of Article XX 
by the panel. It stated that, generally, the goal of the overall safety of the 
multilateral trading regime is not the rationale of the chapeau of GATT 
Article XX, nor is it an interpretative rule, right or obligation under the 
chapeau.126 Conversely, the chapeau’s aim is to ensure that GATT excep-
tions are invoked in good faith, hence serving the goal of avoiding the 
manipulation of Article XX.127
The next point is that the AB ruled that the chapeau was a manifes-
tation of the ‘principle of good faith’, referring to the US-Gasoline decision 
where it had already explained that the ‘good faith’ in the GATT/WTO 
context meant that a conflicting national regulation was not a means of 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restriction to 
trade’.128 The AB equally stated that the assessment of the good faith of 
the government implementing the conflicting measure could be not only 
an a priori analysis, ie of the design of the measure, but also an a poste-
riori review, ie of its actual implementation.129
It is particularly important to note that in deciding whether the US 
regulation passed the chapeau test, the AB invoked an inquiry of the way 
the measure was substantively applicable in practice (ie as opposed to 
the form in which it was designed and administered) as another potential 
criterion for scrutiny. That is, as I mentioned earlier, regarding the ‘means-
end’ relationship, the AB held in US-Shrimp that the measure must be 
expressly put in place to ‘effectively contribute’ (actual implementation) to 
attaining an environmental goal.130 In addition, there should be a sufficient 
124 Based on WTO, ‘Environment: Disputes’ <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
envir_e/edis08_e.htm> accessed 2 June 2015.
125 US-Shrimp (n 70). See eg paras 7.43-45, 7.49-50.
126 US-Shrimp (n 70) para 116.
127 ibid, paras151 and 158.
128 ibid.
129 ibid, para160.
130 ibid, para 141.
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jurisdictional nexus for the measure.131 So, the substantive application of 
the measure in practice was opposed to the form in which it was designed 
on paper, as the AB mentioned in this case in the chapeau analysis. This 
point is very interesting for my later analysis of TBT relevant jurispru-
dence. I will therefore come back to it further in the article.
At this point, it is important to stress that the actual implementation 
of measures should be clearly distinguished from the actual effects of the 
measures (the latter is the empirical ‘effects test’). That is, as has already 
been noted in US-Gasoline, the effects attributable to implementation 
should be distinguished from the implementation itself. More precisely, 
regarding the environmental conservation measures, the AB stated in 
that case that a considerable period of time, perhaps many years, should 
pass before any actual effects of an environmental regulation might be 
observable. So, this should be borne in mind when reading the US-Shrimp 
judgment, particularly the AB’s observations on the actual implementa-
tion of domestic measures.
Finally, and importantly, the AB held that the chapeau is there to 
take care of both sides of the ‘trade and…’ debate and to balance between 
the competing norms of two different natures, thus implying that the legal 
norms of GATT exceptions are equal to the legal norms of GATT rules.132
Later, in US-Shrimp Article 21.5, the AB admitted that unilateralism 
alone would not disqualify the measure under GATT Article XX (something 
which was not entirely clear after the AB report in the initial US-Shrimp 
dispute).133 In this case, in order to implement the recommendations and 
rulings of the AB, the US issued Revised Guidelines for the Implementa-
tion of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea 
Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations. These Guidelines replaced 
the ones issued in April 1996 that were part of the original measure in 
dispute. The Revised Guidelines set forth new criteria for the certification 
of shrimp exporters. In 1997, Malaysia introduced an action pursuant to 
Article 21.5 DSU, arguing that the US had not properly implemented the 
findings of the AB in the dispute. However, the compliance panel held 
that US implementation of the ruling was justified under GATT Article XX 
as long as the conditions stated in the findings of the Report, in particu-
lar the on-going serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agree-
ment, remained satisfied. The AB thus upheld the contested findings of 
the compliance panel.134
131 ibid, paras 133 and 137.
132 ibid, paras 156-159.
133 US-Shrimp, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia [US-Shrimp Article 21.5]: 
Report of the Appellate Body (22 October 2001) DS58, para138. See also D Schneiderman, 
Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (CUP 
2008) 66.
134 WTO summary (n 118). 
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In the second US-Shrimp report, the AB clarified what it had already 
introduced in US-Gasoline and the first US-Shrimp decisions: the cha-
peau’s aim is to prevent manipulations of GATT Article XX with the help 
of the good faith principle.135 As I have already mentioned in the above 
introduction of the general analysis of Article XX, this would include: (i) 
an inquiry into whether the measure takes into account the local condi-
tions in other countries or if it essentially requires that foreign countries 
have to adopt their own policies; (ii) a requirement to explore whether the 
respondent country has engaged in serious, across-the-board negotia-
tions with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements 
to address the socially imperative issue in question (however, according 
to the first US-Shrimp decision, this does not require the actual conclu-
sion of an agreement); and (iii) a condition that the implementation and 
administration of the measure respect basic fairness and due process. 
Hence, the AB laid down the fundamental criteria for the application of 
the good faith principle for the purposes of the non-discrimination analy-
sis of the interpretation of GATT exceptions.  Let me just make a remark 
to recall that earlier in this analysis it was mentioned that the normative 
framework of the TBT per se seeks to discipline the domestic process of 
the implementation and administration of technical regulations. There-
fore, it would also be worth examining whether the above good faith re-
quirements or comparable criteria were applied by the AB in the recent 
settlement of TBT disputes.
This case, as some commentators have argued, could have been de-
cided under the TBT.136 In May 1998, Canada filed a complaint to the 
WTO concerning France’s 1996 Decree on the prohibition of the impor-
tation and sale of asbestos and asbestos-containing products. Canada 
claimed that the French measures breached different provisions of the 
SPS and the TBT, and the GATT Articles III:4 and XI. The European Com-
mission replied that substitute materials had been developed which were 
safer to human health than the carcinogenic asbestos used before. It 
insisted that the French measures were fully justified for public health 
reasons under GATT Article XX(b). Canada argued for a broad interpreta-
tion of ‘like product’ under the GATT, with an additional claim under the 
TBT Agreement.137
The panel in EC-Asbestos in the first instance separated the meas-
ure into the ban and the exceptions to that ban. It found that the French 
135 US-Shrimp Article 21 (n 113) paras136-48.
136 See eg Porges and Trachtman (n 64) 794; JP Trachtman, The International Economic 
Law Revolution and the Right to Regulate (Cameron May 2005) 141-142; G Marceau and JP 
Trachtman, ‘A Map of the WTO Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods’ in GA Bermann and 
PC Mavroidis (eds), Trade and Human Health and Safety (CUP 2006) 62
137 See also WTO, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries’ (2012) 54 <http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm> accessed 15 May 2014.
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ban was not covered by the TBT, whereas the immunities under TBT Ar-
ticle 2 were potentially applicable.138 However, as Canada had not made 
separate claims with respect to the ban’s immunities under the TBT on 
public interest grounds, the panel declined to examine their compatibility 
with the TBT.139 Instead, the panel found a violation of NT under GATT 
Article III:4, given that the ban specifically treated chrysotile asbestos 
fibre less favourably than ‘like’ substitute fibre, and products containing 
chrysotile asbestos fibre were treated less favourably than ‘like’ products 
containing substitute fibre.140 The panel established that the measure 
was justified on the grounds of the exception of human health protection 
in accordance with GATT Article XX(b), and also fulfilled the conditions 
set out in the chapeau.141
The AB, having rejected the panel’s reasoning that the ban was not 
covered by the TBT, whereas the exceptions under TBT Article 2 were po-
tentially applicable, reversed the panel’s decision and concluded that the 
ban as an ‘integrated whole’ was a TR as defined in TBT Annex 1.1 and 
was thus covered by the TBT; nevertheless, and astonishingly, the AB did 
not complete the legal analysis of Canada’s TBT claims as it judged that it 
did not have an ‘adequate basis’ upon which to examine them.142
It is important to highlight several crucial interpretive points of the 
AB report in EC-Asbestos. First, the AB laid down the general interpreta-
tive guidelines for the term ‘technical regulation’: (i) the products sub-
ject to the measure in question must be identifiable; (ii) a measure must 
wholly lay down product characteristics or their related PPM; and (iii) 
compliance with the measure must be mandatory.143
Second, while reversing the panel decision, the AB introduced the 
well-known and widely cited set of factors for the definition of ‘like prod-
ucts’ for the purposes of GATT Article III:4 that focuses on the competi-
tive relationship between imported and domestic products, largely draw-
ing on the Border Tax Adjustments market-based criteria.144 It should 
be recalled that they are: physical properties, end use, consumer tastes 
and habits, and tariff classification. When reversing the panel’s ruling to 
exclude health effects from the ‘likeness’ test, the AB found that panels 
must analyse the physical characteristics of products that affect the com-
petitive relationship in the marketplace, including health risks.145
138 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos [EC-
Asbestos]: Report of the Panel (18 September 2000) DS135,  paras 8.63 and 8.70.
139 EC-Asbestos (n 138) para 8.72.
140 ibid, paras 8.157-158.
141 ibid, paras 8.223 and 8.240.
142 EC-Asbestos (n 11) paras 64-70, 74-75, 80.
143 ibid, paras 66-70.
144 GATT Working Party Report (n 66).
145 EC-Asbestos (n 11) para 100.
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Third, while being clear about the factors for the specific market-
based ‘likeness’ test, the overall AB perspective regarding the ‘like’ prod-
ucts analysis when a public interest regulation is at issue was somehow 
ambivalent. Porges and Trachtman point to an inconsistency between 
this AB approach and the theory of regulation, which states that the 
reason for regulatory intervention is because the health risks are not suf-
ficiently reflected in the marketplace.146 However, the AB has not brought 
the more regulation-sensitive ‘aim and effects’ test into its review of the 
panel’s ‘likeness’ analysis; as long as health risks are consistent with 
regulatory concerns, the AB has accepted some considerations that form 
the basis of regulatory ‘aims’.147
The EC-Asbestos decision, together with US-Shrimp, indicated that 
trade jurisprudence has shifted towards the more balanced interpreta-
tion and application of public policy exceptions under the GATT 1994.148 
Moreover, in these three WTO cases, namely, US-Gasoline, US-Shrimp, 
and EC-Asbestos, the AB postulated the basic principles of interpretation 
of the GATT public policy exceptions.
Overall, such a turn suggests that the AB is a ‘reflexive institution’,149 
attentively listening to critiques about its interpretive approaches, hence 
also about the WTO collective habits of interpretation,150 reflecting on 
these and evolving together with global trends and fashions, as well as 
those internal to the GATT/WTO regime. 
To summarise, a deliberate decision of the GATT panels in the first 
two Tuna cases to push the PPM issue out of the orbit of trade law appears 
as an effort, at least among other things, to maintain a sort of normative 
hierarchy of the GATT regime by giving no autonomous importance to the 
particular issue of good process, and the environment more generally. I 
presume that this move of the GATT in the early 1990s contributed to 
the abandonment of the issue of good process and the overall regula-
tion of the environment within global commercial and investment flows 
to other realms of global governance traditionally deemed as ‘private’ (eg 
contracts, indicators, labelling, and, of course, voluntary standards such 
as ISO). I then suppose that, when the WTO judicial bodies, particularly 
the AB, later included the PPM in first-row considerations regarding ‘like’ 
products under different WTO agreements, including TBT jurisprudence, 
it was a – conscious or unconscious – move to bring the regulation of the 
process of production back within the realm of its global jurisdiction. 
146 Porges and Trachtman (n 64) note 56.
147 ibid , 795.
148 In this sense, see eg Schneiderman (n 133) 66.
149 ibid.
150 I met this concept for the first time, in Lang (n 72). See eg at 170-171, 179, 181, 185.
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Otherwise, it may also reveal that the AB may be cautious about the over-
all legitimacy of the world trade regime, in terms of caring not only about 
the structural unity and normative coherence of its legal organisation, 
but also about the wider social perception of the GATT/WTO.
4 The WTO’s technical barriers to trade (TBT) agreement 
The TBT aims at providing equilibrium between the autonomy of na-
tional regulation and the policy goals of trade liberalisation.151 More pre-
cisely, TBT disciplines are designed to deliver a legal framework for state 
regulations constituting non-tariff measures (NTMs) such as human 
safety and health, plant life and health, prevention of deceptive prac-
tices, and environmental protection.152In trade jargon, the term ‘NTMs’ 
designates non-tariff policy measures that can potentially affect trade in 
goods.153
At the outset, on a potential objection that such domestic instru-
ments are already governed by the GATT national treatment provisions 
of Article III:4, (or else those of  MFN, GATT Article I; transparency, GATT 
Article X; quantitative restrictions GATT Article XI) and, consequently, 
by the GATT public policy exception clauses of Article XX, the answer 
is that the TBT governs the so-called technical regulations, standards, 
and conformity assessment measures. That is, these instruments deal 
with the methods relating to the process of the production of imported 
and domestic goods: labelling requirements, safety requirements for cars, 
recycling requirements on packaging, and the like. They are aimed at a 
variety of ends, from informing the consumer about the composition of 
a product to putting conditions on the market access of imported goods. 
Notably, on the one hand, today we face a proliferation of such public 
policy NTMs. On the other hand, public health and the environment are 
areas where the regulatory process goes hand in hand with technical 
innovation. That is, regulation at the domestic level is increasingly af-
fected by efficiency concerns, such as necessity, scientific justification, 
procedural legitimacy, and consistency, resulting from pressure from in-
ternal lobbies through the  coordination at the international level, and 
the creation of international standards.154 The TBT thus contains various 
disciplines on state regulatory processes, requiring an important degree 
of transparency, coherence, and consistency in regulation to assure trad-
151 MJ Trebilcock, ‘Foreword’ in T Epps and M J Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook on the 
WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade (Edward Edgar 2013) xi.
152 See WTO, ‘Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade’ <http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm>
153 For a definition, see eg WTO, The World Trade Report 2012: Trade and Public Policies: A 
Closer Look at Non-tariff Measures in the 21st Century (WTO Publications 2012), 38ff.
154 Hoekman and Kostecki (n 2) 462-465; Mavroidis et al (n 1) 263; Lang (n 72) 159. 
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ing partners that protectionism is not rooted at some deep level in the 
regulatory process.155
But first things first: before delving into an analysis of the relevant 
TBT disciplines and case law, as well as the normative considerations 
underpinning them, the following sections primarily sketch the funda-
mentals and relevant historical and conceptual developments of the TBT 
framework.
4.1 The fundamentals of the TBT 
On plain reading of the above introduction of the TBT, the agreement 
is supposed to disentangle the possible trade-distorting effects from the 
trade-facilitating aspects of NTMs by binding WTO members to guarantee 
that technical regulations and product standards do not constitute un-
necessary barriers to trade.156
It is argued that the TBT regime aims at solving the conflict between 
the two kinds of opposite effects of domestic regulations by separating 
‘protectionist’ standards from ‘legitimate’ ones.157 The normative frame-
work within which TBT untangles the two consists of two fundamentals: 
standards harmonisation on the one hand, and the administrative pro-
cess that precedes the creation and implementation of national technical 
regulations on the other.158
The rationale of the first fundamental is the conviction that a more 
homogenous technical regulation at the global level can diminish the 
number of transnational risk disputes, and, by creating a network of 
homogenised standards, would provide the WTO with a mechanism for 
disentangling legitimate standards from protectionist ones.159 Accord-
ingly, the WTO supports the creation of standards within several global 
standard-setting institutions, including the IEC, ISO, and the like.160
155 See generally, R Howse, ‘Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial 
at the World Trade Organization” (2000) University of Michigan Law Review, 2329, as cited 
in R Howse and E Tuerk (2001), ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations: A Case Study 
of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: 
Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing) 286.
156 TBT Preamble, 5th and 6th recitals.
157 Perez (n 85)116.
158 ibid 116-117.
159 ibid.
160 Overall, ISO collaborates with over 700 international, regional and national organisa-
tions that take part in the standard setting and development process, as well as sharing 
expertise and best practices. The ISO has observer status at the FAO Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and in the TBT Committee. It is expressly referred to in the WTO SPS and 
TBT Agreements (the latter using the ISO/IEC Guide for a definition of some matters). 
ISO, Organizations in Cooperation with ISO <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/organi-
zations_in_liaison.htm> accessed 17 March 2015.
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The second fundamental is driven by the aim to discipline the admin-
istrative process by which technical regulations are introduced.161 One of 
the central tools for this task is the technocratic, scientific, assessment 
of the creation and design of a regulation:162 ie the two external sources, 
international standards and science, seem to have the ultimate verdict 
over the distinction between legitimate and protectionist technical regula-
tions, turning it into a functional legal conception. The apotheosis of this 
approach is actually the test under TBT Article 2.2, where the efficiency 
and risk management metaphors, such as necessity, scientific justifica-
tion, procedural legitimacy, and consistency may play a crucial role.163
4.2 The main TBT disciplines
The introduction of the concepts of the domestic regulation of social 
imperatives, and NTMs properly speaking, to world trade law deserves 
particular attention here. According to influential mainstream commen-
tators of the world trade regime, roughly, NTMs (or ‘non-tariff barriers’, 
or ‘regulatory trade barriers’) fall into one of three broad categories: (i) 
regulatory protectionism, ie measures purportedly concerned with con-
sumer protection, or other policy purposes, but with a component that 
could be utilised to favour domestic producers; (ii) regulatory divergence, 
ie regulatory differences across countries, arising either arbitrarily or 
based on different regulatory traditions and preferences; and (iii) regula-
tory reform, ie measures aiming at improving the regulatory process or 
the efficiency of regulation.164 And if it is not one of these three issues, it 
is contended  that the measure should not be seen as a barrier distorting 
trade. To these I would add the category of ‘regulatory inadequacy’, ie a 
public policy regulation could be irrelevant or simply inapt to adequately 
meet the corresponding objectives set, hence, as a side effect, also pos-
sibly distorting trade. On the other hand, regarding WTO member state 
appreciation, Robert Howse assumes that ‘there is no natural or self-
161 Perez (n 85) 117.
162 ibid.
163 See eg R Howse’s ‘WTO Seals: What Is It Really That Makes the AB Think that TBT 
Doesn’t Apply?’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 25 May 2014)  <http://
worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/05/wto-sealswhat-is-it-really-that-makes-the-
ab-think-that-tbt-doesnt-apply.html> accessed 15 December 2015; Perez (n 85) 115-121; 
S Lester, ‘Technical Barriers to Trade (Technical Regulations & Standards)’ (Presentation made 
at the Academy of WTO Law and Policy, Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington, DC 19 November 2013). 
164 S Lester, ‘Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP / Regulatory Trade Barriers’ (International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog, 17 December 2013) < http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/
ielpblog/2013/12/regulatory-cooperation-in-the-ttip.html > accessed 1 April 2015.  See 
also S Lester and I Barbee, ‘Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership’ (2013) Journal of International Economic Law 1; World Trade Report 
(n 153) 5.
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evident baseline or rule that can solve’ what should and what should not 
fall into the category of a regulatory trade barrier.165
In practice, relevant NTMs are the key trade instruments governed 
by the TBT: ie technical regulations (TRs). The second key trade instru-
ment covered by the agreement is standards. Both set out specific char-
acteristics of a product (size, shape, design, functions, performance, etc), 
hence the way a product is produced can affect these characteristics.166 
A principled difference between a TR and a standard lies in compliance: 
while compliance with TRs is mandatory, because regulations are them-
selves binding instruments, conformity with standards is not, the latter 
being voluntary mechanisms.167
Whereas the TBT definition of the TR is relatively ambiguous, the 
substantive obligations that the agreement imposes are rather straight-
forward: Article 2.1 contains NT and MFN obligations, while Article 2.2 
states that TRs should not be unnecessary obstacles to trade.168 Inter-
estingly, specialists say that during the talks over the TBT substantive 
obligations text, the negotiators eventually shifted from terms like ‘seri-
ous’ (eg ‘serious barrier to trade’) to the vocabulary of ‘necessity’ (eg ‘more 
trade-restrictive than necessary’).169 This remark is very useful for an 
analysis of relevant case law and subsequent normative understanding of 
the AB’s interpretive choices, and will be taken up further in the article.
The TBT also covers conformity assessment procedures. These are 
technical procedures, eg testing, verification, inspection and certification 
that confirm that products fulfil the requirements laid down in regula-
tions and standards.170 Regarding the operation of standards, the same 
non-discrimination obligations as above are stipulated in TBT Annex 3 
(D), and, regarding the operation of conformity assessment, in TBT Arti-
cle 5.1.1.  
The main objectives of both TRs and standards covered by the TBT 
are the protection of human safety or health (eg labelling of cigarettes 
to indicate that they are harmful to health); the prevention of decep-
tive practices (eg labelling or packaging requirements in order to protect 
165 ‘Individual member states’ perceptions of what policies fall on one side of the line and what 
on the other are going to vary depending on ideology, regulatory traditions, and so forth, all 
of which generate intuitions about whether someone’s regulatory behavior looks like “normal” 
public policy or, rather, like something that might only be done in the circumstances for pro-
tectionist reasons.’ R Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy – and Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 94, 104.
166 Mavroidis et al (n 1) 264-266; Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 523; see also WTO (n 152).
167 Mavroidis et al (n 1); Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3).
168 Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 524.
169 Lester (n 163).
170 WTO (n 152); Guzman and Pauwelyn (n 3) 523.
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consumers through information); the protection of animal/plant life or 
health (eg requiring that endangered species of fish reach a certain length 
before they can be caught); and the protection of the environment (eg reg-
ulating the re-cycling of paper and plastic products, or the levels of motor 
vehicle emissions).171 Other objectives may include quality (eg requiring 
that vegetables and fruits reach a certain size to be marketable) and tech-
nical (eg harmonising certain sectors, such as telecommunications) har-
monisation, or trade facilitation (eg harmonising customs equipment).172
As mentioned earlier, the trade measures covered by the TBT deal, 
among other things, with methods relating to the process of the produc-
tion of imported and domestic goods.173 In trade jargon, these are called 
‘process and production methods’ (PPM).174 Let me recall that the general 
importance of the PPM issue vis-à-vis trade law is whether the ‘like’ prod-
ucts with a different PPM could be treated differently by the parties to the 
world trade regime. PPMs could be divided into two categories: product-
related PPMs and non-product-related PPMs.
5 Relevant TBT jurisprudence
It has already been mentioned above that until very recently the TBT 
has been a rather ‘dormant’ WTO agreement, and has been interpreted 
only once – in 2002 in the case EC-Sardines.175 Since 2009, however, 
consultations have been requested, and subsequently three disputes 
have been brought to the WTO DSB (US-Clove Cigarettes,176US-Tuna II 
171 WTO (n 152).
172 ibid.
173 TBT Annex 1.
174 For a very nuanced account of PPM in GATT/WTO law, see R E Hudec, ‘The Product-
Process Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ in Bronckers and Quick (n 68) 187ff.
175 The EC Regulation (EEC) 2136/89 for the European common market standards on pre-
served sardines specified that only products prepared from Sardina pichardus species could 
be marketed/labelled as ‘preserved sardines’. Following this, while the species of sardines 
found mainly in the Eastern North Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea 
(so, mainly in Europe), Sardina pilchardus Walbaum, were tradable under the EC regula-
tion, the Sardinops sagax sagax, found mainly in the Eastern Pacific along the coasts of 
Peru and Chile, were not tradable under this regulation. On such basis, Peru filed a com-
plaint arguing that the policy stopped Peruvian exporters from using the trade description 
‘sardines’ for their exports in Europe. In particular, Peru argued that, according to the rel-
evant Codex Alimentarius standards, Sardinops sagax sagax is listed among those species 
that are marketable as ‘sardines’, including in Europe. It thus submitted that the above 
measure constituted an unjustifiable NTB by breaching GATT Article XI:1 and TBT Articles 
2 and 12. WTO, ‘European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines’ <http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds231_e.htm>  accessed 1 September 2015; 
see also WTO, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries 1995 – 2011’ (2012) 
91.
176 This dispute concerned Section 907(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA). This measure, while outlawing the production and distribution of clove cigarettes, 
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(Mexico),177and US-COOL), all of which have fully engaged the TBT. All 
three cases have reached the stage of appeal, and in 2012 the AB final-
ised its three reports. One of the three decisions, namely US-COOL, was 
followed in 2014 by a compliance panel hearing, where the panel had to 
establish whether the US had taken the necessary steps to implement the 
decision. The panel’s ruling was appealed by Canada and Mexico, and in 
May 2015 the AB issued its US-COOL Article 21.5 report. In this report, 
the WTO AB, while weighing the necessity of the regulation in question, 
raised the notion of margin of appreciation. In this article, the above in-
terpretative development represents the apotheosis of the interest of the 
part on the WTO law analysis. 
In the sections that follow, I will first briefly introduce the US-COOL 
row of disputes. Then, instead of analysing TBT cases in chronological or-
der, I will track one, some or all of them (together with previous relevant 
disputes where needed) per relevant issue, while focusing especially on 
the last AB report – the COOL Article 21.5 dispute. The highlighted issues 
are various interpretive and normative considerations regarding the dis-
crimination and necessity analyses under the TBT.
as well as most other flavoured cigarettes in the US, did not ban menthol-flavoured ciga-
rettes. The vast majority of clove cigarettes consumed in the US prior to the ban were im-
ported from Indonesia. Indonesia filed a complaint under the TBT (but not under the SPS!), 
arguing that the ban on clove cigarettes was a discriminatory NTM, and that it was also 
unnecessary. Indonesia further claimed that the US acted inconsistently with a number of 
procedural and similar requirements under the TBT (actually, almost all of the 12 para-
graphs of TBT Article 2) in the context of preparing and implementing the TR in question. 
See US-Clove Cigarettes (n 12).
177 The US argued that for years, in Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean tuna fishery, dolphins 
were an intrinsic part of the fishing operation; the fishermen would intentionally capture 
both tuna and dolphins together, then release the dolphins from the net – some dolphins 
were released alive, and some were not. In the tropical waters of the Pacific Ocean west of 
Mexico and Central America, large yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) swim together with 
several species of dolphins: while this ecological association of tuna and dolphins is not 
clearly understood, it is asserted to have two important practical consequences – (i) it has 
formed the basis of a successful tuna fishery; and (ii) it has resulted in the deaths of a large 
number of dolphins. See US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s 
Southwest Fisheries Science Center Report ‘The Tuna-Dolphin Issue’ <https://swfsc.noaa.
gov/textblock.aspx?Division=PRD&ParentMenuId=228&id=1408> accessed 1 September 
2015; and WF Perrin, B Wursig and JGM Thewissen (eds), Encyclopedia of Marine Mammals 
(Academic Press 2002) 1269-1273. This was the main reason why the US regulations in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific, where the Mexican fleet fishes, were far more restrictive than they 
were for the Western and Central Pacific where the US fleet fishes. Namely, the US Con-
gress blocked tuna fished with purse-seine nets from the US market. Mexico claimed that 
the measures at issue that established the conditions for the use of a ‘dolphin-safe’ label 
on tuna products and that conditioned access to the US Department of Commerce official 
dolphin-safe label on the bringing of certain documentary evidence imposed a discrimina-
tory burden on certain tuna, depending on where it was caught, and the fishing method by 
which it was harvested, thus were inconsistent, inter alia, with TBT Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 
2.4. WTO, United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products (Dispute Settlement) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds381_e.htm> accessed 1 September 2015.
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5.1 Overview of the US-COOL row
COOL is the abbreviation for the US country of origin labelling re-
quirements for beef and pork, as contained in the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1946. Instruments comprising the COOL measure were amended 
by the Farm Bills of 2002 and 2008, and implemented by the USDA 
through its 2009 Final Rule on Mandatory Country of Origin Labelling. 
There was also a letter issued by US Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack on 
the implementation of the COOL measure (Vilsack letter). The main re-
quirements included the obligation to inform consumers at the retail level 
of the country of origin in respect of the covered commodities, including 
beef and pork. Eligibility for the designation of a covered commodity as 
exclusively having a US origin could only be derived from an animal that 
was exclusively born, raised and slaughtered in the US. This would ex-
clude such a designation for beef or pork derived from livestock that was 
exported to the United States for feed or immediate slaughter. The COOL 
requirements in question were argued to breach, inter alia, TBT Articles 
2.1, 2.2 and 2.4.178
Overall, in its original ruling, the AB upheld, but for different rea-
sons, the panel’s finding that the policies in question were in breach of 
TBT Article 2.1 by granting less favourable treatment to imported Cana-
dian cattle and hogs than to like US cattle and hogs.179 The AB reversed 
the panel’s finding that the COOL measure violated TBT Article 2.2 be-
cause its legitimate objective of providing consumers with information on 
origin was not fulfilled.180 It declared itself unable to complete the legal 
analysis and determine whether the COOL measure was more trade re-
strictive than necessary to meet its objective.181 Regarding international 
standards, the panel found that Mexico had failed to establish that the 
COOL measure violated TBT Article 2.4, and this has not been reversed 
by the AB.182 The panel concluded that CODEX-STAN 1-1985 was an 
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the pursued objective because 
the exact information that the US wanted to provide to consumers, ie the 
countries where an animal was born, raised and slaughtered, could not 
be conveyed through this standard.183
In 2013, Canada requested the establishment of a compliance pan-
el. At its meeting, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel. This 
178 United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements [US-COOL],(25 
September 2013) DS384 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds384_e.htm> accessed 1 March 2015. 
179 US-COOL (n 12) paras 478-79.
180 ibid. para 479.
181 ibid. para 491.
182 ibid. para 485.
183 ibid. See also United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements [US-
COOL]: Report of the Panel (18 November 2011) DS384, para 7.567.
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case addressed whether the updated measure taken by the US in 2013 
complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings in the original US-
COOL dispute. Canada and Mexico challenged the treatment accorded to 
imported Canadian cattle and hogs, and imported Mexican cattle, under 
the US’s amended COOL rules for beef and pork. This amended COOL 
measures consisted of: (i) the ‘COOL statute’ (7 U.S.C. § 1638), which 
remained unchanged from the original dispute; and (ii) the ‘2013 Final 
Rule’ (78 Fed Reg 31367) amending certain provisions of the 2009 Fi-
nal Rule (74 Fed Reg 2658) following the original dispute.184 The com-
pliance panel US-COOL Article 21.5 was then established.185 The panel’s 
decision was appealed, and on 18 May 2015 the AB issued its report. 
Regarding TBT Articles 2.1 (discrimination) the AB upheld the panel; and 
regarding Article 2.2 (necessity), it made no finding as to whether the 
amended COOL measure was inconsistent with Article 2.2, though plac-
ing a nuance on a few points that are crucial for the present analysis. For 
example, the AB stated:
…we do not consider that a complainant must demonstrate 
that its proposed alternative measure achieves a degree of 
contribution identical to that achieved by the challenged 
technical regulation in order for it to be found to achieve an 
equivalent degree. Rather, in our view, there is a margin of ap-
preciation in the assessment of whether a proposed alterna-
tive measure achieves an equivalent degree of contribution, 
whose contours may vary from case to case. In particular, a 
margin of appreciation in assessing the equivalence of the re-
spective degrees of contribution may be affected by the nature 
of the risks and the gravity of the consequences arising from 
the non-fulfilment of the technical regulation’s objective...186
That is, the AB pointed out that the panel must have assessed the 
risks of non-fulfilment, and the role of the legitimate objective, as these 
criteria would affect the application of a margin of appreciation that na-
tional regulators benefit from. These factors, as well as the related prin-
ciples and interpretive criteria will be discussed in the remainder of this 
article by analysing US-COOL Article 21.5 and other decisions under the 
TBT, as well as relevant interpretive moments under the GATT.
184 WTO, Appellate Body Reports <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_
reports_e.htm> accessed 1 March 2015.
185 United States - Certain Country of Original Labelling (COOL) Requirements - Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico [US-COOL Article 21.5] (20 October 2014) DS 
384 and 386.
186 US-COOL Article 21.5 (n 12) para 5.254 (emphasis added).
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5.2 The same, the same, but different (and how is it different from 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation?): more deference under the TBT 
than under the GATT
The first puzzling question is why the AB seems to do a more defer-
ential analysis under the TBT non-discrimination provisions than under 
the GATT ones.187 The broad preamble of the TBT justifies this deference, 
but does not the chapeau of GATT Article XX do so as well? Furthermore, 
domestic regulations are limited by a ‘necessity’ test that is applicable to 
certain regulatory measures under both GATT Article XX(b) and TBT Ar-
ticle 2.2. Both provisions require that states use the least trade restrictive 
means reasonably available, although the TBT necessity test is consid-
ered to be broader than the obligation under GATT, as it requires that all 
measures falling under the TBT, whether or not discriminatory, should 
be no more trade restrictive than necessary.188 As neither agreement re-
quires a clearly scientific basis as a foundation for the conflicting meas-
ure, states may have more discretion as to the choice of the end to pursue 
in comparison with the SPS measures; however, the importance of the 
end comes into the test of ‘necessity’ in both GATT and TBT through the 
risks of non-fulfilment of the objective pursued.189 Hence, we have the 
necessity test under both GATT (Article XX(b)) and the TBT (Article 2.2), 
additional necessity requirements in the chapeau of GATT Article XX and 
the similar least restrictive means test in the TBT preamble. In US-Clove 
Cigarettes, for instance, there was no additional deferential enquiry un-
der GATT Article III:4 in the AB ruling.
Another interesting question is why the AB did not use in its three 
2012 TBT reports the concept of good faith that it introduced in US-
Gasoline and clarified in US-Shrimp? Notably, the second recital of the 
TBT Preamble says that the TBT should ‘further the objectives of GATT 
1994’. In US-Clove Cigarettes, the WTO DSB explained the above issues 
of relationship and equilibrium between the goals of the GATT and the 
TBT as follows. It held that, while there was in TBT a set of obligations 
supplementary to those of the GATT, the TBT should be applied so as to 
preserve the same kind of balance between free trade goals and the mem-
bers’ regulatory policy space reflected in the ‘right to regulate’ in GATT:
[t]he balance set out in the preamble of the TBT Agreement 
between, on the one hand, the desire to avoid creating un-
187 Notably, this was the case for the three 2012 TBT rulings discussed above, as well as in 
US-COOL Article 21.5.
188 In this respect, see eg Marceau and Trachtman (n 136) 811ff; AJ Green, ‘Climate Change, 
Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining are Trade Rules?’ (2005) 8(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law, available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=702444> ac-
cessed 10 October 2015.
189 Green (n188) 49.
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necessary obstacles to international trade and, on the other 
hand, the recognition of Members’ right to regulate, is not, 
in principle, different from the balance set out in the GATT 
1994, where obligations such as national treatment in Article 
III are qualified by the general exceptions provision of Article 
XX (my emphasis).190
Here I would like to emphasise that the ‘balance’ set out in the TBT 
and the GATT which the AB underlines does not mean balancing between 
two set of values – at least not in the way that the ECtHR or a national 
administrative tribunal would use it. Namely, ‘balancing’ members’ rights 
to freedom of trade against the recognition of members’ right to regulate, or 
else to set their own levels of protection, is not at all the same as balancing 
the members’ trade-related rights protected under the WTO agreements 
and members’ pressing social needs. The former is about balancing the 
rights to free trade protected by the WTO agreements against members’ 
measures restricting trade when setting their own level of protection. This 
line is clearly – and increasingly – practised by WTO judges, especially the 
AB. However, the latter is about balancing the objective pursued by a state 
measure restricting the rights protected by the ECHR against the legiti-
macy of the measure itself. This approach used by the ECtHR was never 
properly applied within the world trade regime adjudication. Note, however 
that the ‘means-end’ test under GATT Article XX was held by the AB in US-
Shrimp, implying that measures must be expressly designed to contribute 
to attaining a legitimate objective. So, the substantive application of the 
measure in practice was somehow balanced by the AB in this case in the 
chapeau analysis against the form in which it was designed on paper.
It is worth noting that in US-COOL Article 21.5, the AB seems to take 
yet another stance. Namely, the assessment concerned the hypothetical 
impact in the case of the non-fulfilment of a regulation in the context of 
a necessity analysis.191 That is, as already noted in US-Gasoline, the ef-
fects attributable to implementation should be distinguished from the 
implementation itself. Now let us recall that in US-Clove Cigarettes the 
AB stressed that the TBT should be interpreted so as to preserve the 
same kind of balance as the GATT between free trade goals and members’ 
regulatory policy space, that is, their right to regulate.192 However, in US-
COOL Article 21.5, the AB now decided that 
190 US-Clove Cigarettes (n 12) para 182.
191 US-COOL Article 21.5 (n 12) paras 5.277-79; 5.295-296.
192 ‘The balance set out in the preamble of the TBT Agreement between, on the one hand, 
the desire to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and, on the other 
hand, the recognition of Members’ right to regulate, is not, in principle, different from the 
balance set out in the GATT 1994, where obligations such as national treatment in Article 
III are qualified by the general exceptions provision of Article XX…’,US-Clove Cigarettes (n 
12) para182.
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a technical regulation itself, or its associated instruments, 
may reveal elements relevant to the nature and gravity of the 
risks addressed. However, the Panel did not consider the evi-
dence and argumentation presented by Canada and Mexico 
to substantiate the connection between specific aspects of 
the design, architecture, and structure of the amended COOL 
measure, on the one hand, and the nature of the risks of 
the non-fulfilment of its objective or the gravity of the conse-
quences arising from its non-fulfilment, on the other hand.193
So, here it is not a WTO-type of balancing between free trade goals 
and members’ right to regulate. That is, following the US-Gasoline ruling, 
the effects attributable to implementation should be connected with, yet 
distinguished from, the implementation itself. This type of reasoning is 
not exactly the same as balancing the objective pursued by a measure 
against the legitimacy of the measure itself. However, while in US-COOL 
Article 21.5 the AB clearly does not assert that the objective, design, and 
structure of the measure are worth the measure itself, it seems to suggest 
here that the panel should have considered whether the objective, design, 
and structure of the measure are worth the gravity of the consequences 
arising from its non-fulfilment. That is, instead of enquiring whether the 
aim of the measure is legitimate enough to deem this very measure legiti-
mate (which would have been a proper balancing), the AB seems to look 
at what would happen if the measure was not applied and its objectives 
were not reached.
In US-COOL Article 21.5, the AB appears to make two distinctions. 
Firstly, it seems to make an interpretation distinct from relevant points in 
the earlier GATT jurisprudence regarding the right to regulate. Secondly, 
and in relation with this, the AB seems to make an interpretation distinct 
from applicable accounts in the preceding TBT jurisprudence, that is, to 
balance the conceptions very different from the three TBT cases of 2012: 
instead of weighing free trade obligations and the right to regulate, it 
balances the design of the measure, the nature of the risks of the non-
fulfilment of its objective, and the gravity of the consequences arising 
from its non-fulfilment. That is, it somehow echoes two of the four crite-
ria of the overall proportionality test in ECtHR jurisprudence related to 
the MoA, mentioned above in Section 1.3.2: (i) the reasons presented by 
the authorities should be relevant and sufficient and the means-end test 
should be satisfied – viz, the measure should be a proportionate response 
to the need;194 and (ii) the effects of the treatment should be proportion-
193 US-COOL Article 21.5 (n 12) paras 5.286 (emphasis added).
194 Abdulaziz (n 53) paras 74-84. See also Malone v The United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14; 
Silver v The United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347; Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (1979) 
2 EHRR 245; Muller v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 212; and Vereinigung Demokratischer 
Soldaten Osterreichs und Gubi v Austria (1994) ECHR 50.
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ate in relation to the pursuit of the policy objective and should manage to 
strike an equilibrium between the protection of the interests of the com-
munity and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Con-
vention.195 That is, the strict proportionality test involves, among other 
things, assessing whether the reasons presented by the government are 
relevant and sufficient, and balancing between pressing social need for 
some restriction of the Convention, and a proportionate response to that 
need through a particular policy or behaviour of the authorities.
Furthermore, the following AB remark in the most recent decision 
points to a further assumption:
A technical regulation itself, or its related instruments, might 
contain elements pertaining to the nature of the risks it seeks 
to address and the gravity of the consequences arising from 
the non-fulfilment of its objective.196
We can understand by this that national regulators may themselves 
know very well the nature of the risks they aim to address and the grav-
ity of the consequences arising from the non-fulfilment of the objective 
of their regulation. So, I presume this could be an assertion of greater 
deference to domestic regulators – in the sense that they are competent 
enough to discern and bear the importance and/or legitimacy of the aim 
pursued by a regulation.
5.3 Ranking in favour of one value: market competition and how it 
is dismissed in US-COOL 21.5 
Both GATT Articles III and XX and the relevant provisions of the TBT 
agreement deal with the justification of domestic regulatory measures 
other than fiscal ones (the latter are decided by GATT Article III:2), as 
related to legitimate (non-protectionist) objectives and as the least trade-
restrictive alternative reasonably available. Regarding the competition 
analysis of domestic non-fiscal regulatory measures, we should recall 
that the ‘like products’ test is based on the four criteria set forth in Border 
Tax Adjustments197and essentially endorsed by the panel in EC-Asbestos. 
Namely, in examining ‘likeness’, the panel considered only factors that 
were decisive for a competitive relationship between the imported and 
domestic goods in the domestic market-place: physical characteristics, 
end use, consumer tastes and habits, and tariff classification.198 This 
195 Belgian Linguistic case (n 30) paras 34-35.
196 US-COOL, Article 21.5, para 5.284.
197 GATT Working party report (n 66) 97. See also Hudec (n 65)113. 
198 Notably, the EC said that substitute materials had been developed in place of asbestos – 
a highly carcinogenic substance – which are safer to human health. The panel, in using only 
an economic competitive comparisons test (see Panel Report, 8.112ff), found that the French 
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logic of basic economics of the panel in EC-Asbestos was extensively criti-
cised and was required to be balanced with a regulatory context and in-
tent approach, which can be equally found in international investment 
arbitration.199 That is, the de facto discrimination issue appeared in the 
EC-Asbestos dispute, and the AB’s decision settled some of the old argu-
ments, while correcting an odd panel ruling.200 In deciding this dispute, 
the panel rejected the regulatory context and intent approach in con-
cluding that health considerations should be irrelevant in determining 
whether products are ‘like’ for purposes of assessing domestic regula-
tions; however, the AB reversed such an approach.201
In the EC-Asbestos case, the AB affirmed that the basic purpose of 
GATT Article III is the discipline of non-discrimination, not that of mar-
ket access as such – ie it aims at restraining protectionist measures.202 
Nonetheless, the AB also accepted the relevance of applying market com-
petition criteria to ‘likeness’ in cases such as EC-Asbestos, rather than 
considering properly regulatory purposes such as protection of health.203 
Thus, according to the AB, the panel erred not in the application of such 
criteria, but in assuming that in so doing factors such as effects on health 
could be excluded from the economic analysis.204 Consequently, on the 
one hand, in the EC-Asbestos dispute the AB did not advocate a regu-
latory context and intent approach to complement the purely economic 
analysis primarily looking at consumer and market preferences – quite 
the contrary, it opted to rely on ‘objective’ economic evidence, survey 
data, and a cost-benefit analysis as an indication of the non-discrimi-
nation norm.205 On the other hand, however, the AB also accepted that 
the defence of legitimate regulation in disputes concerning NT requires 
attention to be given to the purpose of a challenged regulation, not just a 
formalistic analysis based on the Border Tax Adjustments criteria.206 All 
measures were discriminatory, but justified for public health reasons under GATT Art. XX 
(b), while the AB reversed this panel finding (AB Report, para 109ff), and stressed that the 
French measures were not discriminatory, and were fully justified for public health reasons 
under GATT Article XX (b) (see eg para 172, quoting the Korea-Beef ruling). 
199 For a general overview see A Newcombe and L Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Trea-
ties, Standards of Treatment,(Wolters Kluwer 2009); M Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized 
Property (Nijhoff Publishers 1986); and  M Sornarajah The International Law on Foreign Invest-
ment (4th edn, CUP 2015).
200 Porges and Trachtman, (n 64) 794.
201 EC-Asbestos (n 11) paras 99, 109, 114, 117, 122-124.
202 Howse and Tuerk (n 155) 292; Lang (n 72) 260-62.
203 Although, in EC-Asbestos, one member of the AB, Justice Feliciano, did not agree with 
the use of  the ‘like products’ test involving only economic competitive comparisons in cases 
involving such key human values as life and health. See EC-Asbestos (n 11) paras 149 and 
152-154.
204 Howse and Tuerk (n 155) 288. 
205 In this sense, see Lang (n 72) 262.
206 Porges and Trachtman (n 64) 785-86.
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in all, I rather agree that it is perfectly understandable that the panel’s 
reasoning (finding that a legitimate domestic regulation aiming at protect-
ing humans from the harm of a carcinogenic product may be ‘discriminato-
ry’ according to an ‘objective’ market-based analysis) could be intuitively 
unappealing207 – for most of the litigators, WTO members, academia, and 
the wider public. That is, I think this is the main reason why the AB had 
so bluntly criticised the panel and eventually reversed its ruling. Yet, it 
ultimately accepted the relevance of market competition criteria for the 
‘likeness’ test in cases relevant for health measures without paying much 
attention to regulatory aims and context factors.
The above competitive relationship test involving essentially eco-
nomic comparisons between an imported and domestic group of goods in 
the domestic market now seems to be somewhat confirmed in US-Clove 
Cigarettes regarding the analysis under TBT Article 2.1. That is, in its re-
port, the AB rejected the panel’s regulatory aims and effects approach.208 
In US-Clove Cigarettes, contrary to the EC-Asbestos ruling, the AB fo-
cused on market competition and applied the market-based test. Joost 
Pauwelyn posed questions in this respect as follows: ‘whom should we 
ask to see whether products, here sub-groups of cigarettes, sufficiently 
compete?’209First, ‘not only … the main consumers of clove and menthol 
cigarettes, particularly where it is clear that an important proportion of 
menthol cigarette smokers are adult consumers’, but all relevant con-
sumers of the products at issue were considered by the AB.210 Further, 
the AB, in using the data of a survey conducted only in respect of a seg-
ment of consumers, that is, young smokers, concluded that ‘young and 
potential young smokers perceive clove and menthol cigarettes as suf-
ficiently substitutable. This, in turn, is sufficient to support the Panel’s 
finding that those products are like’ (emphasis added);211 ‘actual competi-
tion does not need to take place in the whole market, but may be limited 
to a segment of the market’.212, 213
Another crucial issue for the non-discrimination analysis was the 
term ‘menthol’, viz the competitive relationship seems to be seen through 
just clove articles versus menthol articles. It was the term ‘menthol’ then 
that was the root of the detrimental impact assessment under TBT Article 
207 Lang (n 72) 264.
208 US-Clove Cigarette (n 12) para112.
209 See J Pauwelyn, ‘Questions on Impact of Cloves on GATT National Treatment’ (Interna-
tional Economic Law and Policy Blog, 6 April 2012) < http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/
ielpblog/2012/04/questions-on-impact-of-cloves-on-gatt-national-treatment.html> accessed 1 
April 2015.
210 US-Clove Cigarette (n 12) para 137.
211 ibid, para 144.
212 ibid, para 143.
213 See Pauwelyn (n 209).
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2.1. Interestingly, on the question concerning what if menthol had been 
included in the regulation from the beginning, during his presentation 
at the 2013 WTO Academy, Simon Lester assumed that most probably 
the US would have won the case; or that would at least have brought the 
case away from non-discrimination (TBT 2.1) and hence it would have 
been decided only under necessity (TBT 2.2).214 The question that arises 
is should one look at the detrimental impact at the time of the enactment 
of a regulation or later – ie after it has been implemented? This may also 
relate to the accounts of the previous section concerning the assessment 
of the actual and future effects of a technical regulation.
Under TBT 2.2, the AB delves more into the design, architecture, 
and structure of the amended TR, as well as the nature of the risks of the 
non-fulfilment of its objective, and the gravity of the consequences aris-
ing from its non-fulfilment (and also criticises the panel for not doing so 
sufficiently):
…In this regard, we recall the interpretation of the phrase 
‘taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’ set 
out above, namely, that ‘taking account’ calls for an active 
and meaningful consideration of ‘the risks non-fulfilment 
would create’ in the weighing and balancing under Article 2.2. 
At the same time, this requirement is also sufficiently flexible 
so as to be adaptable to the particularities of a given case. 
Thus, certain aspects of a technical regulation may be salient 
to ‘taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’ in 
a given case. (…)
However, the Panel did not consider the evidence and argu-
mentation presented by Canada and Mexico to substantiate 
the connection between specific aspects of the design, archi-
tecture, and structure of the amended COOL measure, on the 
one hand, and the nature of the risks of the non-fulfilment of 
its objective or the gravity of the consequences arising from 
its non-fulfilment, on the other hand (my emphasis).215 
Coming back to avoiding properly performing the TBT Article 2.2 
necessity test, in US-COOL the AB did not find that the measure cre-
ated an unnecessary obstacle to trade, because it found that it could not 
‘complete the analysis’ under Article 2.2.216 In US-Clove Cigarettes the AB 
found discriminatory treatment between clove and menthol cigarettes as 
214 Lester (n 163).
215 US-COOL Article 21.5 (n 12) para 5.286.
216 In this respect, see remarks of J Pauwelyn ‘COOL ... But What Is Left Now for TBT Art. 2.2?’ 
(International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 3 July 2012) < http://worldtradelaw.typepad.
com/ielpblog/2012/07/cool-but-what-is-left-now-of-tbt-art-22.html > accessed 30 April 2015.
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it did in US-Tuna II (Mexico) between ETP and non-ETP tuna – hence a 
violation of TBT Article 2.1, but avoided assessing whether the conflict-
ing regulations were ‘more trade restrictive than necessary’ pursuant to 
TBT 2.2.217 More recently, in US-COOL Article 21.5, the AB agreed with 
the compliance panel that the amended COOL violated TBT Article 2.1 in 
according discriminatory treatment to Canadian and Mexican livestock, 
and that the amended COOL was not more trade restrictive than neces-
sary within the meaning of TBT Article 2.2, the measure making ‘a con-
siderable but, necessarily partial contribution’ to its objective of provid-
ing consumer information on origin.218
In US-Clove Cigarettes, non-discrimination seems to be at the heart 
of the dispute. However, while being at odds with flavoured cigarettes and 
how they attract young smokers, the regulators included in the ban com-
peting (mostly Indonesian) clove cigarettes, but not (mostly American) 
menthol cigarettes.219 In US-Tuna II (Mexico), non-discrimination was al-
ready less the crux of the dispute: Mexico was mainly complaining about 
the US not assigning the dolphin-safe label to (mainly Mexican) ETP tuna 
caught with a monitor on board, so ‘setting on dolphins’. By finding dif-
ferential treatment between ETP and non-ETP tuna, the AB, however, 
avoided addressing the root cause of this dispute.220 In US-COOL the mat-
ter of protectionism of US meat seems to be even less obvious – although, 
if the product origin labelling is supposedly a legitimate goal (as the AB 
found), then the problem with COOL is less one of discrimination (TBT 
Article 2.1), but rather whether the labelling requirements are more trade 
restrictive than necessary.221 The latter interpretive option – ie to assess 
the legitimate goal of the COOL against the COOL measures themselves 
– would have been closer not to the usual GATT/WTO necessity analy-
sis, but to proportionality/balancing. Again, the parallel with the ECtHR 
MoA approach is far from perfect. Namely, in proportionality/balancing 
related to the MoA test, we do not really assess the measure itself to see 
217 ibid.
218 US-COOL Article 21.5 (n 12) 5.279 and 5.284. 
219 See S Lester, ‘Free Trade and Tobacco: Thank You for Not Smoking (Foreign) Cigarettes’ 
(2012) 49 Free Trade Bulletin, Cato Institute (15 August 2012) 1-2. See also Pauwelyn (n 
216).
220  Pauwelyn (n 216).
221 ‘Ultimately, what the AB faulted COOL on was not so much origin-based discrimination 
but rather the fact that, irrespective of the origin of the meat, “the informational require-
ments imposed on upstream producers under the COOL measure are disproportionate as 
compared to the level of information communicated to consumers through the mandatory 
retail labels” (para 347). This “disproportionality” was, in turn, considered as not being 
“even-handed” which, in turn, was recognised as “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimina-
tion” which, ultimately, led the AB to conclude that COOL’s detrimental impact on imports 
did not “stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction” (para 349). Is this “dispro-
portionality” really a matter of discrimination between Canadian and US meat? Or rather a 
question of necessity/proportionality of the measure as a whole?’ Pauwelyn (n 216)
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if its restrictive effects exceed what is necessary to achieve the legitimate 
goal (taking account of the risks, etc), as seems to be the case in the US-
COOL Article 21.5 ruling. We rather balance the legitimate goal itself, in 
assessing its legitimacy, against the restrictive effects of the measure. 
However, what may anyway be the potential reasons for the AB to rule as 
it did in the US-COOL Article 21.5 ruling?
I presume WTO panels and the AB could be less inspired to make 
an analysis of the necessity of a domestic regulatory measure because 
this would certainly involve rather more of very delicate political consid-
erations, eg how to avoid protectionism but not undermine regulatory 
autonomy and the actual ability to promote national social imperatives. 
For one, the above rulings under the TBT suggest that the WTO tribu-
nals, and especially the AB, have probably considered that too much of 
a necessity investigation would appear as an inappropriate enquiry into 
government motivation, risk and other regulatory management, and sim-
ply too much intrusion into domestic policy space. That is, a proper bal-
ancing/proportionality test. This assumption could be confirmed by the 
comparable application of TBT Article 2.2 in the US-Tuna II (Mexico) panel 
report that was upheld by the AB. That is, both tribunals did not delve 
too much into the legitimacy of the US measure per se in light of whether 
the corresponding requirements of the label were more trade restrictive 
than necessary. The panel decided that, in order to be deemed legitimate, 
a measure that aims at a particular end – to protect life or health, more 
exactly – need not be directed exclusively to endangered or depleted spe-
cies or populations, within the meaning of TBT Article 2.2.222 
The importance of the legitimate objective grounding the technical 
regulation in question, the extent to which such a legitimate objective 
could be scrutinised, and similar considerations were even more pro-
nounced, and were actually crucial in the AB analysis in US-COOL Article 
21.5. The section that follows is entirely consecrated to this analysis.
5.4 ‘Whether the reasons presented by the government are relevant 
and sufficient, and whether there exists a pressing social need’
As already mentioned, it appears from the TBT jurisprudence that, 
in order to be deemed legitimate, a regulation that aims at a particular 
end does not need be directed exclusively to that particular, narrow, end 
within the meaning of TBT Article 2.2.223 The importance of the legitimate 
objective grounding the TR in question and the extent to which such a 
legitimate objective could be assessed seem to be specifically underlined 
222 United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products [US-Tuna II (Mexico)]: Report of the Panel (15 September 2011) DS381, para 7.347; US-
Tuna II (Mexico): Report of the Appellate Board (n 12) para 342.
223 US-Tuna II (Mexico): Report of the Appellate Board (n 12).
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by the terms ‘importance to the Member implementing the regulation’ 
introduced by the AB: 
As we see it, the importance of the objective to the Member 
implementing the technical regulation at issue could inform 
the analysis under Article 2.2 in some capacity, to the extent 
it is reflected in the level considered appropriate by the Mem-
ber to pursue the relevant objective, or the actual degree of 
contribution made by the technical regulation to its objective. 
For instance, where a Member chooses a high level of fulfil-
ment for a technical regulation to contribute to its objective, 
this may be indicative of the importance this Member places on 
the fulfilment of that objective, and evidence pertaining to the 
importance a Member places on an objective might inform an 
assessment of the degree of contribution made by the tech-
nical regulation to its objective.  Thus, we would ordinarily 
expect the gravity of the consequences arising from the non-
fulfilment of the technical regulation’s legitimate objective to 
correlate, at least to some extent, to the importance of the 
objective to the Member concerned (my emphasis).224
This approach is different from the relevant interpretive points in 
the GATT jurisprudence discussed above, for the AB seems to underline 
that members have certain discretion in considering what could consti-
tute a legitimate objective of a particular regulation – ie the nature of the 
risks they seek to address and the gravity of the consequences arising 
from the non-fulfilment of the objective of their regulation. In this case, 
we might be closer to the unlocking of a proper balancing test mapping 
on proportionality stricto sensu. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that the above excerpt suggests that the permissible extent of regulatory 
discretion of members actually depends on the importance of an objec-
tive to a member, and less on its legitimacy. So, the latter should not be 
strictly assessed against the measure itself. Here we seem to be closer to 
the right of members to regulate at the levels they consider appropriate, 
hence farther from proportionality/balancing.
On the other hand, it is somehow different from the AB’s previous 
line in the 2012 TBT trilogy. Namely, in these three cases, while not 
bringing too much into question the choice of what exactly could and 
could not be deemed as legitimate objectives important within the regula-
tory space of members, the AB did not expressly assume that states best 
know what could constitute an important legitimate objective, and that 
their regulations may themselves already contain elements pertaining to 
the nature and importance of the objective pursued. 
224 US-COOL Article 21.5 (n 12) para 5.279.
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Unexpectedly enough, the approach of the AB in US-COOL Article 
21.5 seems to somehow echo the principle of the evaluation of democratic 
necessity and proportionality – ie whether the reasons presented by the 
government are relevant and sufficient, and whether there exists a press-
ing social need – used in the MoA application of the ECtHR.225 However, 
here the AB seems to call the panels to perform, as part of a holistic 
analysis, the determination of flexibility – or discretion – that the WTO 
members have regarding one or another relevant TBT issue. By doing 
this, the AB seems to suggest that domestic regulators should be, and 
normally are, perfectly able themselves to decide democratically what is 
an appropriate level of protection for them. That is, the AB emphasised 
that members have a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ in considering what 
could constitute a legitimate objective important for their nation. In this 
case, the AB is closer to the MoA as developed and used in Strasbourg. 
Alternatively, the AB possibly suggested that the extent of regulatory dis-
cretion could depend on the importance that the objective of relevant 
measures has for members. This interpretation seems to depart from the 
relevant interpretive points in the GATT as discussed above, as well as in 
the TBT jurisprudence. Yet, this is also different from the margin of ap-
preciation concept discussed in this article – especially as developed by 
the Strasbourg Court. 
6 Concluding remarks 
The WTO TBT Agreement aims at striking an equilibrium between 
the trade and non-trade goals of members, and at offering a legal frame-
work for state regulations protecting human and plant life and health, 
consumer interests, the environment, and the like. In most of the juris-
prudence under the TBT, WTO tribunals, and especially the Appellate 
Body, while not mentioning it expressly, seem to enquire too much into 
the discriminatory effects of the domestic regulation in question under 
TBT Article 2.1, while avoiding scrutinising too much the legitimacy and 
the management of the regulation under TBT Article 2.2. In its latest rel-
evant ruling, US-COOL Article 21.5, the Appellate Body appears to spell 
out such a tendency. In addition, in this case, the Appellate Body clearly 
raised the concept of margin of appreciation – at the international level, 
an interpretative development and perquisite of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
The margin of appreciation concept maps onto a strict proportional-
ity analysis. While proportionality stricto sensu relates to the proportion-
ality of the means related to the ends, and the balancing between two 
values deemed equal, the necessity test means that the ranking is a priori 
225 See eg Marckx (n 56) para 41; Handyside (n 32) paras 48-49.
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fixed in favour of one value. A few points should be specified here. Pro-
portionality stricto sensu, while it may be seen as even more controversial 
than the necessity test, is not exactly about balancing what the regula-
tion achieves (ie the ‘importance’ of the objective) versus its costs – in the 
WTO, the costs to trade (so, its trade restrictiveness). It is rather about 
comparing the legitimacy of the objective of a measure (the legitimacy of 
the objective defending non-trade interests – so, non-trade values) with 
the regulation itself (its costs to trade, so trade values). That is, in my 
view, in trade law, proportionality stricto sensu would be balancing the 
legitimacy of a measure’s trade restrictiveness against its actual and po-
tential trade restrictiveness. On the other hand, the assessment of the 
margin of appreciation as held in Strasbourg should primarily depend 
on weighing the importance of the sovereign (non-human rights) interests 
of parties to the Convention, such as domestic security, and of rights 
(human rights) protected by the ECHR. In my opinion, there could be no 
such delimitation within the trade regime. Indeed, both main interests 
of the parties and the rights protected by the WTO treaties are about free 
trade: ie trade interests and trade rights. Also, and in relation to this, it 
has been clearly demonstrated in my paper that the role of the GATT/
WTO tribunals is the enforcement of the mutual – trade – obligations of 
the members. However, according to the principle of subsidiarity – one 
of the core principles related to the concept of margin of appreciation 
– the supervisory meaning of the ECHR and the related function of the 
Strasbourg Court is the effective protection of human rights rather than 
the enforcement of mutual obligations between parties to the Conven-
tion. That is, the latter should not be interpreted restrictively in deference 
to sovereign legislative authority. These points obviously constitute one 
of the reasons why the WTO Appellate Body reference to the margin of 
appreciation concept in the US-COOL Article 21.5 judgment attracts so 
much attention. 
As I have demonstrated in the analysis of WTO case law throughout 
this paper, under GATT relevant jurisprudence, WTO judges applied a 
necessity test properly speaking. Until the US-COOL Article 21.5 decision, 
under the TBT, WTO adjudicators, and especially the Appellate Body, 
added nuances to the necessity test with considerations related to the 
right of WTO members to regulate in order to set their own level of pro-
tection. 
In the US-COOL Article 21.5 ruling, however, the Appellate Body ap-
peared to consider members’ discretion inherent in the design and ap-
plication of their regulations. Yet, the Appellate Body refused to expressly 
comment on the reasons for introducing some sort of balancing in its 
reasoning, as well as on its avoidance to scrutinise the management of 
the regulation in question under the necessity test of TBT Article 2.2. 
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Overall, the interpretative developments within world trade adjudi-
cation, relevant for the margin of appreciation concept, could be sum-
marised as follows: 
- GATT panels before the inception of the WTO: a strict necessity 
test where virtually no balancing took place at all – ranking was 
clearly fixed in favour of trade liberalisation values;
- WTO DSB jurisprudence under the GATT in ‘trade and debate…’: 
a flexible necessity test where some degree of balancing was tak-
ing place – the ranking was fixed rather in favour of trade and 
market competition values, but some room for non-trade values, 
especially health and the environment, was granted on exception-
al grounds;226
- Recent WTO DSB jurisprudence under the TBT: more balancing, 
a very lax (I would say, ‘impossible to fail’) necessity test, much 
more deference to the regulator in terms of legitimacy of the aim 
of the measures in question;
- US-COOL Article 21.5: the same very lax necessity test, even more 
deference to the regulator in terms of legitimacy of the aim of the 
measures, plus an appeal to the margin of appreciation concept.
The latest interpretative development in US-COOL Article 21.5, name-
ly the WTO Appellate Body’s plea for the margin of appreciation concept 
may have interesting developments for future WTO cases. At least two 
scenarios are possible. Either the Appellate Body has suggested in this 
ruling that members have certain discretion in considering what could 
constitute a legitimate objective of a particular regulation. In this case, in 
assessing the legitimacy of the objective of a measure against the meas-
ure itself, we might be closer to the unlocking of a proper balancing test 
mapping on proportionality stricto sensu. Or the Appellate Body’s inter-
pretation implies that the permissible degree of regulatory discretion of 
members actually rather depends on the importance of the objective to 
a member, and not – or less – on its legitimacy, so the latter should not 
be placed under strict scrutiny. Here we seem to be closer to the right of 
members to regulate at the levels they consider appropriate – the inter-
226 Please note that I am not talking here at all about the recent WTO case EC-Seals for 
the main reason that, taking into account the parallel with the ECHR interpretation of the 
margin of appreciation, and consensus on values constituting part of its factors, it would be 
very confusing to compare the latter WTO DSB decision. Indeed, in the EC-Seals case, the 
DSB, and especially the AB, ruled in what could be judged the opposite and somehow em-
barrassing way compared to the ECHR appreciation of an inter-state consensus on values, 
as for instance, in the Handyside case discussed in the first section. That is, in EC-Seals, 
the WTO DSB somehow affirmed a sort of universal value of public morals. In Handyside, 
recall that the ECtHR said that even within Europe it is difficult to find a common denomi-
nator of public morals.
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pretations proper to the established GATT/TBT jurisprudence, and hence 
farther from proportionality/balancing.
Notably, as explained in the paper, under the ECtHR’s application of 
margin of appreciation, a treatment that is different for some categories 
in the exercise of Convention rights must be deemed discriminatory if it 
is proved unnecessary. So, it could be presumed that if, in future, WTO 
judges wanted to use under the TBT the concept from Strasbourg, they 
would need to start from the necessity test (Article 2.2), and then move 
on to the non-discrimination analysis (Article 2.1). That is, in theory, in 
order to continue with non-discrimination, the tribunals would first have 
to decide that the measure is unnecessary – something that in practice 
the WTO Appellate Body seems to avoid at any cost.
As a last remark, as well as perhaps an issue for future research, I 
would like to note that, as explained at the beginning of the paper, most 
of the interpretative factors, fundamental principles and values under-
lying the concept of margin of appreciation as developed by the Stras-
bourg Court are expressly or tacitly Eurocentric. Take for instance the 
standard of European consensus as used in the related jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR. Therefore, any endeavour to use the concept of margin of 
appreciation in other legal regimes would involve a sort of transplant of 
relevant Eurocentric values, concepts, standards and principles. Without 
doing so, it would be impossible to use this concept properly. But by do-
ing so, in the particular case of the WTO, we risk building just another 
hegemonic project of the type ‘GATT-before-1995’ inside the world trade 
regime. Such a ‘transplant’ from ECtHR to WTO jurisprudence might also 
provoke a ‘rejection’, or an ‘anti-body reaction’.
